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Introduction 
 
In a world where information is increasingly relevant to our social, cultural and 
economic existence it is vitally important to understand the legal boundary of digital 
property.1  To this end this article presents a preliminary framework for understanding the 
process through which digital property is being constructed.2  It aims to highlight through 
select and recent cases the constitutional, legislative, contractual and technological 
dimensions of digital property.3  
 
I. The Constitutional Mandate:  The Enumerated Intellectual Property (IP) Power 
 
In Australia, Canada and the United States of America, the federal or national 
legislature is given significant power in their respective federating Constitutions to enact laws 
with respect to intellectual property.  While not all “digital property” comes within the 
constitutional definition of intellectual property4 (as you will see below), these constitutional 
                                                 
* This article was given impetus by an invitation to deliver a Special Lecture at the University of Western 
Ontario Law School in London Ontario, Canada in October 2000.  It was further developed through Spring 
2001 while teaching at Santa Clara University Law School and was further refined through a conference 
presentation at Roger Williams University School of Law, Bristol, Rhode Island, in April 2001.  I owe thanks to 
David Rice, Mark Perry, Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Richard Gold, Nicholas Pengelley, Michael Lehmann and 
Anne Fitzgerald.  
** Brian Fitzgerald is Professor and Head of the School of Law and Justice at Southern Cross University in New 
South Wales, Australia.  He is co-editor of one of Australia's leading texts on e-commerce and has published 
articles on Law and the Internet, Technology Law and Intellectual Property Law in Australia, the United States, 
Europe and Japan.  Over the past two years, Brian has delivered seminars on information technology and 
intellectual property law in Australia, New Zealand, China, the United States, Canada, Norway and The 
Netherlands.  
1 See generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 2 
(1999) (explaining strategies for success in network economy); Lester C. Thurow, Building Wealth:  New Rules 
for Individuals, Companies and Nations in a Knowledge-Based Economy 116-25 (Harper Business ed., 2000) 
(explaining the importance of intellectual property to modern company’s success or failure); Frank Webster, 
Theories of the Information Society (John Urry ed., 1995) (announcing the predominance of information in 
modern societies); Bernadette E. Lynn, Intellectual Capital: Unearthing Hidden Value by Managing 
Intellectual Assets, Ivey Bus. J., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 48 (recognizing the importance of Intellectual Capital); see 
also Don Tapscott et al., Digital Capital:  Harnessing the Power of Business Webs (2000) (discussing the 
business models used to create wealth in the digital economy); Stephan Bernhut, Measuring the Value of 
Intellectual Capital, Ivey Bus. J., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 16 (pointing out the vital importance of intellectual capital 
in the new economy). 
2 See also Brian F. Fitzgerald, A Legal Framework for Understanding Informational Property Entitlements in 
the Digital Environment, at http://www.innovationlaw.org/lawforum/pages/lectureseries.htm (last visited Oct. 
20, 2001). 
3 Brian F. Fitzgerald, Intellectual Capital and Law in the Digital Environment, Ivey Bus. J., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 
22. 
4 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay 
sources of the key type of information property, namely, intellectual property (IP), are an 
obvious and necessary place to begin this analysis.  The constitutional provisions are 
expressed as follows:   
 
Australia 
 
Section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth Parliament 
may make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect 
to:  “Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks.”  
 
Canada 
 
Pursuant to sections 91 (22) and 91 (23) of the Constitution Act, 1867 the Canadian 
Parliament has exclusive power to legislate in respect of "Patents of Invention and 
Discovery" and "Copyrights."  Trademarks are covered by the trade and commerce power.5
 
United States 
 
 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution empowers the Congress 
to legislate:  “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”  Trademarks are covered by the Commerce Clause.6
 
Immediately upon reading these provisions one is drawn to comment that the U.S. 
provision is written in a more flowery and prosaic language, perhaps representing the style of 
constitutional drafting of an earlier era or one consequent to a revolution.  The U.S. provision 
appears to be much more explicitly guided by a purpose for granting intellectual property 
rights – to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing exclusive rights for 
limited times – than are the Australian or Canadian provisions.  The crucial issue that has 
arisen in relation to these sources or fonts of intellectual property is the extent to which they 
empower governments to propertize information.  Are there any limits?  Is it possible to 
create rights in information that last in perpetuity? 
 
Different types of limits are asserted, such as: 
 
• the purpose for which the IP right is granted/public domain user rights 
• type of information that the constitution will allow to be propertized 
• length of time a property right will endure 
• medium in which the information exists, e.g., fixed in a tangible form 
 
The follow up question that has arisen is whether these limits, if they exist, may be 
undermined or overridden by other constitutional clauses bestowing legislative power at the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (defining intellectual property rights).  A large amount 
of intellectual property legislation is derived from international conventions/treaties, with the TRIPS agreement 
being a current and concise summary of those international principles. 
5 See McDonald v. Vapor Can. Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 (Can.). 
6 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-95 (1879). 
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federal level or by state laws.7  For example, can the Commerce Clause in the United States 
or the trade and commerce clause in Australia be used to legislate informational property 
rights that surpass any constitutional limits inherent in the respective IP clauses?8  Or will the 
IP clause be read like the unjust acquisition (or takings) clause of the Australian Constitution 
so as to limit the other enumerated federal legislative powers?9
 
 
A. The Rationale and Purpose of IP Rights – The Scope of the Public Domain   
 
A preliminary question and one that is central to the debate over propertizing 
information is the role and purpose of intellectual property law or, if looked at from another 
perspective, the scope of public domain rights.10  Fisher explains that there are (at least) 
four(imperfect yet useful) overarching theories of intellectual property.11   
 
• economic/utilitarian theory:  intellectual property law is justified in terms of economic 
efficiency12 
                                                 
7 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 
376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
8 See Brian F. Fitzgerald, (Australian) Constitutional Limits on Intellectual Property, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 
103 (2001). 
9 See Austl. Const. ch. I, pt. V, § 51, cl. xxxi.  The Australian Constitution, amongst other things, divides the 
legislative powers of the Australian federal system between the Commonwealth (central) and State (regional) 
governments.  Section 51 of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth Parliament shall have power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to an enumerated list 
of powers.  As a general rule the empowering clauses of section 51 are seen as independent sources for 
legislative action, although section 51 (xxxi) is a clear exception to that rule.  Section 51 (xxxi) confers a power 
on the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to “the acquisition of property on just terms from 
any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.”  The provision 
operates, firstly, to give the Commonwealth power to acquire property and, secondly, as an individual right or 
guarantee to private property protected by “just terms.”  See Georgiadis v. AOTC (1994) 179 C.L.R. 297 
(Austl.); Mutual Pools & Staff Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1994) 179 C.L.R. 155 (Austl.).  In acting as a guarantee, 
the clause is said to remove from other clauses the power to compulsorily acquire property.  However, if 
another clause in section 51 displays, by words or content, an intention to allow acquisition without just terms 
or if the acquisition is of a type that is not susceptible to just terms, the guarantee is not operative.  Therefore 
statutes imposing taxation, penalties by way of forfeiture of property or a bankruptcy scheme are not seen as 
infringing the guarantee of or right to private property protected by section 51 (xxxi).  See Mutual Pools, 179 
C.L.R. at 169-71, 177-81, 186-89, 219-22; see also Health Insurance Commission v. Peverill (1994) 179 C.L.R. 
226 (Austl.); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513 (Austl.). 
10 See generally Yocahi Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure 
of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999) (including in the definition of the public domain works 
protected by copyright but that may be used without the permission of the copyright owner under privileges 
such as the fair use doctrine); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990) (defining the 
public domain as the realm unprotected by copyright). 
11 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of 
Property, 169-73 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); see also Anne Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property 7-9 (Law Book 
Co., Sydney 1999); Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 1-21 (2d ed. 
2000); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 288-89 (1988). 
12 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-32 (1984); Millar v. Taylor, 
98 Eng. Rep. 201, 218, 252-53 (K.B. 1769); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 83 (Ronald L. Meek et al. 
eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1762); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 
Yale L.J. 283 (1996). 
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• Lockean/labor desert:  intellectual property rights are natural rights earned through adding 
labor to the common resource of information with the proviso that enough and as good is 
left for others13   
• personhood:  intellectual property is an emanation of the person and the law should 
facilitate this personal aspect14 
• social planning:  intellectual property law should be designed to culturally enrich 
democratic society15 
 
 
Economic Rights 
 
Arguably, the guiding premise of American copyright and patent law is the utilitarian 
ethic that legal protection of intellectual property is needed to advance public welfare because 
it fosters creative genius/product, which can in turn be distributed for the good of the general 
public.16  In the words of the United States Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein:17  
 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’18
 
This economic conception of intellectual property is reinforced by the copyright and patent 
statutes, which bestow rights upon the IP owner to control the economic exploitation of the 
work or product.  The intellectual property law of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia 
has exhibited a similar utilitarian economic basis.19  As well, in these systems the IP owner  
holds economic rights to exploit the information, e.g., the exclusive right of the copyright 
owner to control reproduction.  
 
Lockean Natural Rights 
 
The view that a person possesses a natural right to own what they have created 
through their labour is also very influential in many intellectual property systems throughout 
                                                 
13 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1, at art. 27(2), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 A (III) (1948) (stating “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”); 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993). 
14 See generally Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982) (exploring the 
relationship between property and personhood). 
15 See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 Duke 
L.J. 455 (1991); The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Martha 
Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (discussing the relationship between copyright and literary and artistic 
culture). 
16 See e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway 165-96 (1994). 
17 347 U.S. 201 (1953).
18 Id. at 219. 
19 See Welcome Real-Time SA v. Catuity Inc. [2001] F.C.A. 445, at para. 129 (Austl.); David Vaver, 
Intellectual Property Law 6-13 (1997); David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression 
and the Limits of Copyright in Canada, 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 175, 187-93 (1997). 
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the world.20  In more recent times, though, copyright claims to own information on the basis 
of labour have not been accepted in the United States or Canada per se, although a recent 
decision in Australia was more receptive to such claims.21  If copyright is to be the vehicle for 
the claim to own the value of adding one’s labour to the common stock of information in the 
United States and Canada, then the labour must produce an intellectual product.  Otherwise 
mere “sweat of the brow” claims in those countries will need to be asserted under sui generis 
law like the emerging European database laws, unfair competition law22 or unjust enrichment 
law.23  
 
Moral Rights 
 
In contrast to the Anglo-American approach, the intellectual property law of 
continental Europe (especially copyright law) has long recognised both an economic and 
personal aspect to intellectual property rights.24  The personal aspect which is encompassed 
by the third category of theories in Fisher’s taxonomy is known as a moral right.25  
 
 Moral rights are personal rights belonging to authors or creators of copyright material 
and exist quite independently from economic rights.  They continue to exist even after the 
economic rights have been transferred.  The principal moral rights are: 
 
• The right of attribution, that is the right of the creator of a work to be publicly identified as 
such and to prevent others from claiming authorship of the work, to prevent others from 
wrongfully attributing to an author works that are not his or hers or that are unauthorised 
altered versions of his or her work; and 
                                                 
20 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, at para. 2. (“Intellectual property shall be 
protected.”); Fewer, supra note 19, at 187-89, 191-93 (discussing the application of this theory to Canadian 
intellectual property law). 
21 See Telstra Corp. v. Desktop Marketing Sys. Pty. Ltd. [2001] F.C.A. 612 (Austl.). 
22 See generally Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (discussing unfair competition law); 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (ruling professional basketball games 
were not “original works of authorship” protected by Copyright Act); Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. Dow 
Jones, 456 N.E. 2d 84 (Ill. 1983) (ruling publisher’s stock market indexes and averages could not be used by 
board of trade as the basis for its proposed stock index futures contracts without the consent of the publisher); 
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and a Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 
149, 281 (1992) (suggesting that “the judicial experience in the allied area of restitution has suggested that 
economic and other norms should, and do, condition the implementation of the impulse to grant reward for 
labor expended”); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. 
Rev. 51, 56 (1997) (proposing “either the use of unfair competition principles to protect database contents, or 
the adoption of an intellectual property regime based on more refined liability principles, rather than on 
exclusive property rights, that would reconcile the need for legal incentives to invest with a calculus of net 
social benefits”). 
23 See Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); Bristol v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 30 N.E. 506 (N.Y. 1892); Brian F. Fitzgerald & Leif Gamertsfelder, Protecting 
Informational Products (Including Databases) Through Unjust Enrichment Law: An Australian Perspective, 20 
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 244 (1998). 
24 See Joined Cases C-241-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann and Indep. Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1995 
E.C.R. I-743, at para. 71, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995) (explaining “The Court of First Instance is right . . . in 
stating that the essential function of copyright is to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for 
creative effort”); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15; see generally Millar, 98 Eng. 
Rep. at 252-53; Gerald Dworkin, Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 5 Austl. Intell. Prop. L.J. 5 
(1994).  
25 Fisher, supra note 12. 
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• The right of integrity, that is the right to object to distortions or derogatory distortions of a 
work.26 
 
The obligation to afford moral rights to creators of copyright materials arises from Article 6bis 
of the Berne Convention, which provides that: 
 
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of 
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honour or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the 
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions 
authorised by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. 
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification 
of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death 
of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide 
that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article 
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is 
claimed. 
 
Until recently, Australian law provided only minimal and indirect recognition for moral rights, 
notwithstanding Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.  The recognition of moral rights under 
the Copyright Act, 1968, was limited to a duty not to falsely attribute the authorship of a work, 
a duty not to falsely attribute the authorship of an altered work and a duty not to falsely 
attribute the authorship of a reproduction of an artistic work.  The Copyright Amendment 
(Moral Rights) Act, 2000, which entered into force on December 21, 2000, introduces the 
moral rights of integrity and attribution of authorship and strengthens the earlier prohibition 
on false attribution of authorship.  Under the new Australian law, moral rights are not 
infringed by acts to which the creator has consented, providing the consent is in writing and 
meets certain other conditions. 
Interestingly, Canada introduced moral rights in the Copyright Act of 1931; however, 
scope for waiver has meant that a culture of moral rights has not been prominent in Canadian 
copyright law.27  The United States has legislated for some very limited applications of moral 
rights,28 however many American academics are wary of the potential of moral rights to lock 
up information and inhibit free speech, especially in the context of the Internet.29  
 
Culturally Enriching Rights 
 
                                                 
26 Brian F. Fitzgerald & Anne Fitzgerald, Cyberlaw: Cases and Materials on the Internet, Digital Intellectual 
Property and Electronic Commerce 336 (Prospect Media, Sydney 2002). 
27 See Vaver, supra note 19, at 87-96. 
28 See generally Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (granting rights of 
attribution and integrity to certain authors of visual art); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 
1995) (summarizing the scope of moral rights in the law of the United States). 
29 See generally William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1203 
(1998) (suggesting moral rights should have more limited application in the eclectic transnational and digitized 
world of the Internet). 
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In a world where digitized information (and its control/ownership) is of continuing 
and increasing significance to the economy, society and culture, we have seen renewed 
relevance for and interest in Fisher’s fourth category of IP theory: social planning or cultural 
enhancement theory.  Every significant claim over digital value at issue at the moment can be 
described as one involving a battle between utilitarian or Lockean/natural rights claims to 
ownership versus the creation of intellectual property rights for reasons of cultural 
enhancement.  In the digital environment of an information society, where “information is 
lifeblood,” the cultural aspects of intellectual property are brought into focus.  The 
decentering of the author as creator is part of this phenomenon, but more so the realisation 
that an expressive work is a collection of culturally imbued facts.  As we shall see below, in 
the United States, the power of the First Amendment is being employed to attack the “private 
property” imperialism of the IP statues over information and to thereby assist the case of the 
culture theorists.  
If we live in an information based economy, culture and society, the process of 
propertizing information30 must be seen as being inherently concerned with the way we live, 
think, communicate and construct knowledge.  This takes us far beyond questions of 
economics to key cultural and social issues, which the process of propertizing information 
must now accommodate.  For instance, it is no longer good enough to allocate property rights 
in software without considering the social and cultural implications of the market power and 
monopoly of thought that such a process will engender.  Software is not just code, it is 
discourse, in that it allows us to see and say things in digital space.31   
Free software and open code software projects, in some instances, epitomize a cultural 
rationale for intellectual property rights.32  In the classic free software scenario embodied in 
the GNU General Public Licence (GPL), code is distributed in a manner that is open and free 
                                                 
30 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 
(1935); see e.g., E. Richard Gold, Body Parts: Proprietary Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological 
Materials (Geo. Univ. Press 1996); Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Internet, 
in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment 13 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (stating that although 
traditional property fencing techniques do not work well on the Internet, property is by no means dead, because 
of the initiatives exploring alternative fencing and new extensions of property rights); Thomas A. Stewart, 
Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organizations (Bantam Doubleday Dell 1997); James Boyle, Cruel, 
Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 
2007 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799 (2000); Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 
622 (1998) (discussing the dangers of anticommons property, specifically the under use of resources and the 
lack of effective privileges to use); David Lange, Recognizing The Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., 
Autumn 1981, at 147; Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, Licensing Information in the Global Information 
Market: Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 387 (1999); Lester C. Thurow, 
Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95; Hal R. Varian, 
Versioning Information Goods, (Mar. 13, 1997) (discussing differential pricing known as quality discrimination 
or versioning), at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/papers.html. 
31 See Brian F. Fitzgerald, Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property in Digital Architecture, 
18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 337 (2000). 
32 See Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual Property Incentive 
Paradigm, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 619 (2000) (showing how the science of complexity 
theory is able to explain the open source movement’s ability to translate non-economic incentive mechanisms 
into a process for technological development and innovation); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-
Source Software, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, (2001); Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 25 (2000) (concluding that open source software may have a greater effect on the law of 
developing technologies than the law will have on software practices); David Bollier, The Power of Openness: 
Why Citizens, Education, Government and Business Should Care About the Coming Revolution in Open Source 
Code Software, available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/opencode/h2o/#intro (last visited Oct. 27, 2001) 
(illustrating the broad effect of changes in open code software); www.gnu.org; www.opensource.org (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2001). 
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(not free as in beer but free as in speech), allowing software developers further down the line 
to modify and improve upon the initial software product.  The initial distributor of the code 
controls its presentation and further dissemination through copyright and contract law 
(contractual software license).  In general, subsequent users and modifiers are required to 
further distribute the code they received and to make code of any derivative work available to 
the public.  In this process, copyright law is used to create a “copyleft” effect as opposed to a 
“copyright” effect by mandating that code should be open and free for all to use in the 
innovation and development of software.  In doing so, copyright law is used to structure the 
practices of software developers into a community of effort, while in a broader sense 
ensuring diversity and social innovation of the digital environment and, thereby, social 
existence.  In short, free software and open code projects have the potential to use intellectual 
property law (copyright) to enrich and to better structure cultural existence.  Not every 
developer or all projects under these banners will be minded to act in a culturally benevolent 
manner – some will do it for the purpose of building a reputation that can later be exploited 
for monetary rewards and others will increasingly use open code to augment already thriving 
proprietary business models.33  
Two difficult issues remain to be considered in relation to the culture theory.  Firstly, 
how does it relate to the first theory considered, which is primarily focused on public welfare 
in an economic sense?  There can be little doubt that both theory one and four are concerned 
with public welfare, but in different ways.  Theory one proposes to reward the author in the 
name of public welfare, but the benefit to community or culture becomes a “presumed” 
consequence of the creative activity.34  Theory four is the reverse in that it starts out with the 
community or culture and seeks to explain when it is beneficial for a creator to become a 
property holder.  In this equation, economic efficiency may be considered but is by no means 
a totalising criterion or rationale.35  The conclusion must be that both seek to prosper public 
welfare but from completely different ends of the spectrum.  
Secondly, claims for protection of indigenous cultural materials are also subject to 
increasing attention.  These might be seen as claims to collective or group moral rights or, 
more broadly, as claims that IP law should be used to respect and enhance cultural tradition 
and spirituality.36  A concern is that granting perpetual rights to control information that has 
special cultural significance to indigenous peoples locks up information in a society where 
access to and use of information should be optimised.  Another concern is that if indigenous 
peoples can be allowed to claim the special cultural significance of information, then a way 
will be opened for non-indigenous people to make similar claims in respect of other (religious 
or social) information culturally significant to them.  These responses understate the richness 
of indigenous culture and its plight in the face of unethical economic exploitation.  
 
Proprietary Purpose:  A Limiting Factor 
 
                                                 
33 See generally Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, available at 
http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2001) 
(discussing the evolution of Linux in the commercial world). 
34 See Benkler, supra note 10; Boyle, supra note 30; Julie E. Cohen, supra note 30, (criticising the presumption 
that Intellectual Property law is always economically and culturally beneficial). 
35 It is interesting to contemplate how a cultural approach to IP might be reconciled with the permitted 
exceptions stipulated under TRIPS, arts. 13, 17, 30. 
36 Maroochy Barambah & Ade Kukoyi, Protocols for the Use of Indigenous Cultural Material, in Going Digital 
2000: Legal Issues for E-Commerce Software and the Internet 133 (Prospect Publishing Sydney ed., 2000); 
Terri Janke, Our Culture Our Future: A Report on Australian Indigenous Cultural Intellectual Property Rights, 
43-48 (1988) (stating indigenous people’s desires for protection of indigenous cultural and intellectual 
property); United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art 29 (1993). 
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Whether intellectual property rights are designed to reward people, or to reduce 
transaction costs and increase allocative efficiency, or for reasons of rewarding the fruits of 
labour, or personhood theories or cultural development, the question remains whether any 
purpose or rationale for such rights acts as a limit on what rights can be legislated?  
 
There is sufficient United States Supreme Court jurisprudence to suggest that 
copyright or patent legislation should stimulate economic efficiency.  But in light of the 
recent decision in Eldred v. Reno,37 it might be doubted whether a United States court would 
use this as the basis for any general decision limiting the power of Congress to legislate.  If 
anything, such a rationale for the IP clause would most likely be implemented through 
interpretation of the various elements of the clause. Notions of personhood38 or cultural 
enhancement do not seem to be constitutionally required or entrenched.  However, the 
following statement from Graham v. John Deere Co,39 read at its broadest, suggests that there 
may be a broader purposive limit which, with some imagination, could  embrace notions of 
social impact: 
 
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the 
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the 
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social 
benefit gained thereby.40  
 
In Australia and Canada it is doubtful whether any general limit based on notions of 
economy, personhood or culture would be operational. Once again, if any limits exist they 
must be found in the specific elements of the respective constitutional clauses. Although, the 
recent statement by Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia in Grain Pool of WA v. The 
Commonwealth41 suggests democratic and cultural considerations may be relevant to 
interpreting the scope of legislative power on this issue:   
 
No absolute or unlimited rule may be stated.  The protection of intellectual 
property rights must be afforded in a constitutional setting which upholds 
other values of public good in a representative democracy.  In the United 
States the relevant head of constitutional power has been viewed as containing 
in-built limitations many of which are derived from the competing 
constitutional objective of public access to information:  Graham v. John 
Deere Co.; Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.  In 
Australia, the constitutional setting is different but the existence of competing 
constitutional objectives, express and implied, is undoubted.42
                                                 
37 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  In Eldred, the majority held that the perambulatory words of the United 
States Copyright and Patent Clause – to promote progress of science and the useful arts – are not to be read as 
limits on the legislative power of Congress. This suggests that the purpose for bestowing the legislative power 
becomes relevant if at all in relation to the operative parts or terms of the clause. 
38 See Gilliam v. ABC Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). These issues can be relevant if related to the economic 
incentive argument. 
39 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). 
40 Id.; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S., at 230 (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328 (1859)) 
(“[I]n rewarding useful invention, the ‘rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and 
effectually guarded.’”). 
41 [2000] H.C.A. 14, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/2000/14.html. 
42 Id., at n.218 (citations omitted).  Judge Kirby also talks of “potential benefit to the community.”; see also 
Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 131, 133-34 (Basic Books 1999); Fitzgerald, supra note 
8. 
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Having considered the difficulty courts have with invoking a broad notion of purpose for 
granting IP rights as an enforceable  restraint on legislation, the more interesting question is 
to determine the specific limits that arise from the elements of the clauses.  
 
B. The Type of Information That the Constitution Will Allow to be Propertized  
 
Central to the presentation of digitised information is software. Software has been 
protected as a literary work under the US Copyright Act since 1980 and under the Australian 
Copyright Act since 1984.  Article 10 (1) of the TRIPs agreement also provides that software 
shall be protected as a literary text in copyright law.43  More recently, software has been 
subject to a vast amount of patenting throughout the world.44 It is clear then that the most 
prominent form of digital property has been held to be a type of information that can be 
subject to IP rights.  However, not all information, including digitised information, is 
constitutionally eligible for protection under the copyright and patent heads of power.   
 
1. Raw Data 
 
The classic example of unprotected information is raw data or ideas. Copyright law 
has long taken the view that it protects the expression of data/ideas but not the raw data/ideas 
themselves.45  This view is known as the idea/expression dichotomy and is now embodied in 
the TRIPs agreement:  “Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”46
In the United States Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.,47 it was held that raw data, namely entries in a telephone directory, 
was not subject to copyright protection.  The Court explained: 
 
The sine qua non of copyright is originality.  To qualify for copyright 
protection, a work must be original to the author. . .. Original, as the term is 
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.  To be sure, the requisite level of creativity 
is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  The vast majority of 
works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, "no 
matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might be . . .. Originality does not 
signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other 
works, so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.  To 
illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical 
poems.  Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable.   
 
Originality is a constitutional requirement. . . .  In The Trade-Mark 
Cases, the Court addressed the constitutional scope of “writings.”  For a 
particular work to be classified “under the head of writings of authors,” the 
                                                 
43 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 10 cl. 2 (providing that “Computer programs, whether in source or object code, 
shall be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971)”). 
44 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d. 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Welcome 
Real-Time, [2001] F.C.A. 445.  
45 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
46 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 9 cl. 2. 
47 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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Court determined, “originality is required.”  The Court explained that 
originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity:  
“[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to 
include original designs for engraving, prints, &c., it is only such as are 
original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings 
which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the 
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”   
 
In Burrow-Giles, the Court distilled the same requirement from the 
Constitution's use of the word "authors."  The Court defined "author," in a 
constitutional sense, to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; 
maker."  As in The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court emphasized the creative 
component of originality.  It described copyright as being limited to "original 
intellectual conceptions of the author,"  and stressed the importance of 
requiring an author who accuses another of infringement to prove "the 
existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, 
and conception."   
 
"No one may claim originality as to facts."  This is because facts do not owe 
their origin to an act of authorship.  The distinction is one between creation 
and discovery:  the first person to find and report a particular fact has not 
created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.  To borrow 
from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its "maker" or 
"originator."48
 
Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that the copying of 1309 entries in the white 
pages of the telephone directory was not a copyright infringement nor was the selection or 
arrangement of the entries in basic alphabetical order creative enough to give a thin layer of 
copyright protection to the arrangement of the entries.49
As a consequence of the Feist decision, arguments were made throughout the world 
for the creation of a sui generis form of legal protection for the time and expense of creating 
databases.  In 1996, the European Union adopted a Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Databases50 that proposed a sui generis regime; later in 1996, the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) produced proposals for a similar international scheme for the protection 
of databases.  The EU Directive creates an exclusive sui generis right for the makers of 
databases.51  The general objective of this right is to protect the investment of time, money 
and effort by the maker of a database, irrespective of whether the database is in itself 
innovative.  According to the Directive, a database is protected if there has been a substantial 
qualitative or quantitative investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the 
database.52  The duration of the protection provided by the Directive is fifteen years.53  
                                                 
48 Id. at 345-47 (citations omitted). 
49See BellSouth Advertising & Pub. Co. v. Donnelley Info. Pub., Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993). 
50 Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20. 
51 Id. at art. 8.  The reciprocity principle embodied in art. 11 means that database makers from countries outside 
the EU will not be given the benefits of these database rights unless their countries offer comparable protection 
to EU database makers. 
52 See id. at art. 7. 
53 Id. at art. 10. 
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At present, the WIPO proposal has stalled.  However, the EU Directive is slowly 
being introduced.54  The U.S. Congress has considered a number of proposals for database 
protection but has yet to enact a definitive sui generis regime.  One proposal from 1999 was 
the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act,55 which read in part: 
 
1402. Prohibition against misappropriation 
 
Any person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all or a substantial part, 
measured either quantitatively or qualitatively, of a collection of information 
gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment 
of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause harm to the actual or 
potential market of that other person, or a successor in interest of that other 
person, for a product or service that incorporates that collection of information 
and is offered or intended to be offered for sale or otherwise in commerce by 
that other person, or a successor in interest of that person, shall be liable to 
that person or successor in interest for the remedies set forth in section 1406. 
 
This Act proposed to protect databases for up to fifteen years.56  A more “user friendly” 
proposal was the Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act.57  Variations of both 
proposals are still being considered.58  Canada and Australia do not have a sui generis regime 
for database protection although both countries have been examining the issue for some time.   
An interesting question is whether the Commerce Clause could be used to legislate 
such sui generis database rights in Australia or the United States.  This issue is dealt with 
more fully below; suffice to say, at this point the answer depends on whether the IP clause is 
seen to guarantee an individual’s right to access raw data, override other federal 
constitutional clauses. 
While the Canadian59 and Australian courts may not give exactly the same definition 
to the terms, there could be little conjecture that “copyright,” as listed in the respective 
constitutions, embodies notions of independent creation and a modicum of creativity.60 
However, a recent case in Australia concerning telephone directories has suggested that 
“compilations” may not require intellectual input (creativity) to secure copyright protection. 
In Telstra Corporation Limited v. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty. Ltd.,61 Judge 
Finkelstein of the Federal Court of Australia held that Australia’s leading 
telecommunications provider, Telstra, could maintain an action for copyright infringement 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20, implemented by the Copyright and Rights in 
Databases Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032) (implementing the EU directive in the UK on Jan. 1, 1998); British 
Horseracing Board Ltd. v. William Hill Org., [2001] R.P.C. 31 (Ch. 2001) (Eng.). 
55 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). 
56 Id. § 1408. 
57 H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999). 
58 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 22; see also, Charles R. McManis & Christopher R. Alder, Database 
Protection in the Digital Information Age, 7 Roger Williams Univ. L. Rev. ??? (2001). 
59 See Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info. Inc., [1997] 154 D.L.R. 4th 328 (Can.). 
60 See e.g., Kalamazoo (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Compact Bus. Sys. Pty. Ltd. (1985) 5 I.P.R. 213 (Austl.); ITP Pty. 
Ltd. v. United Capital Pty. Ltd. (1985) 5 I.P.R. 315 (Austl.); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) 
Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Eng.); cf. G A Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd. [1944] A.C. 329 (Austl.); 
Vaver, supra note 19, at 41-45; see also Copyright Law Review Committee, Report on the Simplification of the 
Copyright Act, 1968, Part 2, Categorisation of Subject Matter and Exclusive Rights and Other Issues, paras. 
5.42-.47 (1999) (noting their views on the production of copyright material with computers), at 
http://www.agps.gov.au/clrc. 
61 [2001] F.C.A. 612. 
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based on their white and yellow pages telephone directories.62  In that case, the defendants 
had produced CD versions of the books with a number of value added features such as 
allowing people to search for names through postcode, address or reverse phone number 
searching.63  Judge Finkelstein, relying on a series of English decisions, held that in the case 
of compilations it was not necessary for there to be originality in the sense of intellectual 
input or creativity; sweat of the brow was sufficient.64  He explained: 
 
There is debate as to the meaning of “originality” in copyright law.  
Everyone agrees that for a work to be “original” it must be independently 
created by the author; that is, it must not be copied from another work.  But 
there is a further requirement.  The disagreement concerns the nature of that 
requirement.  There are two schools of thought.  On the one hand there are 
those who say that copyright will only protect intellectual effort, and unless 
there is at least some intellectual labour in the creation of a work, it cannot be 
“original”. . .. 
 
On the other hand there is a school that argues that at least in respect of 
a compilation, the originality requirement will be satisfied if there has been 
some effort expended in producing the work, especially effort in gathering or 
collecting the factual data that is reproduced, though there be no ingenuity in 
the arrangement or presentation of that data.  
 
Quite apart from matters of policy, it might be said that the very nature 
of copyright requires the work to be the product of creative thought.  The first 
copyright statute was enacted “for the Encouragement of learned Men to 
compose and write useful Books.”  These books were necessarily the result of 
the author’s intellectual effort.  That was also true of other works (engravings, 
sculptures, dramatic works and the like) that were given copyright protection 
by the early statutes.  But a compilation is of a different character from a work 
of art or literature.  This is especially true of a compilation of facts that are in 
the public domain.  For this type of compilation to come into existence, the 
facts must be selected, collected, arranged in a particular fashion, and then 
produced in some form.  It may be possible to describe as creative the 
processes of selection, collection or arrangement.  But the creativity is of a 
different order from that involved in producing a work of art or literature.  The 
                                                 
62 Id. at para. 147. 
63 Id. at para. 24. 
The primary data that is used to produce DtMS’ products is taken from Telstra’s 
white pages directories and yellow pages directories.  A Sydney company, Dependable 
Database Data Pty. Ltd., sends every white pages directory and yellow pages directory to the 
Philippines where a large team types (the technical term is key punches) all the listings into a 
computer.  The information is changed in various respects. For example, abbreviations are 
expanded (Rd to Road), the name of the State is included, and the information is formatted so 
that it may easily be read by a computer.  The information is then provided to DtMS in 
electronic form, usually as a computer disk.  
The information is loaded onto the computer system maintained by DtMS. There is 
some cursory validation of the data, but not to any significant extent.  Then information is 
added, such as the appropriate industry code, number of employees, facsimile number and 
Ausdoc DX number.  The information is updated if errors are identified, or if there is a “do 
not contact” attached to a particular name  
Id. at paras. 25-26. 
64 Id. at paras. 84-85. 
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English cases seem implicitly to accept this proposition, because the 
originality requirement for a compilation could not be the same as for other 
works.  More particularly, when it was held that copyright could subsist in a 
work such as a chemist’s stock list (Collis v. Cater), the preparation of which 
involved no intellectual effort, it was apparent that a work could be original in 
the absence of creativity.  The old view of originality had disappeared.  So, 
copyright protection could be claimed by a person who brought out a directory 
in consequence of an expensive, complicated and well organised venture, even 
if there was no creativity in the selection or arrangement of the data. 
That being the law in England in 1911, it became the law in Australia 
in 1912 when the English statute was adopted as the law in this country.65
 
The difficulty with the approach espoused by Judge Finkelstein is that if creativity is not 
required as an element of originality then copyright is awarded for the effort of collection 
and, in essence, provides copyright protection of the facts.  This approach becomes 
problematic if the judge, (as Judge Finkelstein did in this case), takes a broad view of what 
amounts to copying in order to protect the labour of the data base compiler.  While the CD 
versions of the books contained enhancements, the judge seem minded to protect the labours 
of Telstra from wholesale copying by finding that infringement had occurred: 
 
In substance, the respondents say that “the look, feel, arrangement, 
functionality, extent of information, accuracy and purpose [of the CD-roms] 
are all radically different” from Telstra’s products.  They also contend that the 
visual appearance is different because the entries are alphabetically ordered by 
postcode, not arranged in geographical areas, contain full mailing addresses, 
have a layout that is continuous rather than in columns on pages, and are 
displayed in different fonts.  When compared with the yellow pages 
directories, the respondents say that these differences are heightened by the 
fact that no advertisements are taken and the headings are not proximate to a 
group of business names and addresses.  Instead, each business entry has its 
classification entered as part of the data shown in relation to that business.  As 
for the headings, it is said that there has been no reproduction of the 
compilation of headings because what has been reproduced are individual 
headings in relation to individual records of data. . . . 
 
In this case, the substance of the information that has been taken from 
Telstra’s works (the directory portion of the directories and the headings that 
appear in the yellow pages directories and headings books) has been 
reproduced in the CD-roms.  It must be remembered that copyright is not 
claimed for each particular entry, because copyright does not subsist in each 
individual recorded fact.  It is claimed in the whole of the collected data, 
ordered in a particular way.  As regards the directories, the significant 
recorded facts (name, address, telephone number, and the relevant type of 
business) are the same, or substantially the same, as they appear in Telstra’s 
works.  While there are differences, they are in the detail.  For example, when 
displayed on a screen, the information from the CD-rom does not appear as 
columns on a page.  But the information can be retrieved in alphabetical order 
(by postcode rather than region) and can be examined in much the same way 
                                                 
65 Id. at paras. 8, 9, 84-85. 
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as one would read a column on a page.  The fact that the alphabetical listings 
are by postcode and not region, is not a material difference.  Nor is the fact 
that portions of the advertisements are not reproduced.  As regards the 
headings, it is true that they appear once only in each yellow pages directory 
and that the heading appears with each business entry in the CD-roms.  This 
difference is immaterial.  All the headings have been taken, as have all the 
listings beneath those headings.  The appearance of the headings and the 
listings in the CD-roms is sufficiently similar to constitute a reproduction.66
 
The fear becomes that copyright law then takes on the job of protecting the compilation of 
data without adequate safeguards against locking up information.  With the emergence of sui 
generis database regimes in Europe and, inevitably, the United States, it will be interesting to 
see how that case is decided if it goes to a higher court on appeal.  
 
 
2. Plant Breeder’s Rights – Are They Patents? 
 
For digital property to be eligible for legislative construction and protection under the 
respective IP clauses, it must fall within some general notion of copyright or patent (and in 
Australia, design or trademark).  A recent case on plant breeder’s rights shows that, at least in 
Australia, the High Court is reluctant to construe the constitutional mandate too narrowly so 
as to exclude innovative informational products.   
In Grain Pool of WA v. Commonwealth,67 the plaintiff claimed that two Acts of the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia were beyond the enumerated legislative 
powers of that parliament.  The High Court of Australia was asked to consider whether the 
two pieces of legislation – the Plant Variety Rights Act, 1987 ("the Varieties Act") and its 
successor, the Plant Breeder's Rights Act, 1994 ("the Breeder's Rights Act") – were duly 
enacted pursuant to section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution, as explained above, provides that 
the Commonwealth Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to:  “Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and 
trade marks.”68
The Varieties Act provided for the grant of plant variety rights in new plant varieties 
for a period of twenty years.69  The repeal of the Varieties Act by section 78 of the Breeder's 
Rights Act also brought into operation transition provisions, particularly section 82, which 
stated that plant variety rights under the previous statute were to be treated as plant breeder's 
rights under the new statute.  Pursuant to this statutory regime, the second defendant, 
Cultivaust Pty. Ltd., argued that: 
 
• it was the licensee from the State of Tasmania of the Franklin barley rights; 
• this gave it the exclusive right to sell and export Franklin barley, and 
• the plaintiff, in selling and exporting Franklin barley from Australia, had acted 
in breach of the second defendant's rights.70 
 
                                                 
66 Id. at paras. 104, 109. 
67 [2000] H.C.A. 14. 
68 Id. at para. 13. 
69 Plant Variety Rights Act, 1987, § 32 (Austl.) (commencing on the day of acceptance of successful 
application). 
70 Pursuant to section 26 of the Plant Variety Rights Act, a grant was made on January 19, 1990, in favour of the 
Tasmanian Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries with respect to Franklin barley. 
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The plaintiff, Grain Pool of WA, defended against the claims by asserting that the rights 
asserted by the second defendant were ineffective because the grant of those rights was 
beyond the Commonwealth’s legislative powers in section 51 (xviii), (xxix) and (xxxix).71  
The full bench of the High Court held that both Acts were within the powers contained in 
section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution and therefore it was unnecessary to consider whether the 
Acts could be supported under section 51 (xxix) or (xxxix).72
The plaintiff had argued that the operation of section 51(xviii) with respect to "patents 
of inventions" was limited by certain traditional principles of patent law.  They argued that: 
 
• there were certain fixed minimum requirements for the "intellectual effort" required of 
inventors respecting novelty and inventive steps; 
• there was a crucial distinction between process and product claims; and  
• the term "patents" imports a constitutional requirement of the scope of the monopoly 
rights which must be granted and limits the permissible statutory qualifications to those 
rights.73 
 
The court rejected those arguments, finding that the legislative scheme before it was 
sufficiently connected to the notion of "patents of invention."  While inventive step, novelty 
and exclusive rights might be determined differently than they would under the Patents Act, 
1990, that did not mean that the legislation was not with respect to the subject matter of  
"patents of invention."  In other words, the fact that the legislation invoked unique notions of 
novelty, inventive step and exclusive rights in relation to plant breeding did not mean the 
legislation was beyond parliamentary power to legislate with respect to "patents of 
inventions." 
At a broader level, the plaintiff contended that the enumerated head of legislative 
power in the constitution did not support the Varieties and Breeders Act.74  In particular, they 
claimed that the head of power should not be read so as to support legislation granting rights 
for products of every level of intellectual effort.75  
The majority commenced its reasoning by quoting from the joint judgment of the 
High Court in Nintendo Co. Ltd. v. Centronics Systems Pty. Ltd.,76 upholding the validity of 
the Circuit Layouts Act, 1989, where the court considered the construction of the terms of 
section 51(xviii):   
 
The grant of Commonwealth legislative power which sustains the [Circuit 
Layouts Act] is that contained in s 51(xviii) of the Constitution with respect to 
'Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks'. It is of the 
essence of that grant of legislative power that it authorizes the making of laws 
which create, confer, and provide for the enforcement of, intellectual property 
rights in original compositions, inventions, designs, trade marks and other 
products of intellectual effort.77
 
                                                 
71 Grain Pool, [2000] H.C.A. 14 at para. 12. 
72 Id. at para. 136. 
73 Id. at para. 12. 
74 Id. at para. 17. 
75 Id. 
76 (1994) 181 C.L.R. 134 (Austl.). 
77 Id. at 160; see Grain Pool, [2000] H.C.A. 14 at para. 17. 
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The majority explained that an appropriate approach to the interpretation of section 51(xviii) 
was that of Judge Higgins in Attorney-General for NSW v. Brewery Employes Union of NSW 
("the Union Label Case"):78  
 
Higgins J observed in that case that trade marks were "artificial products of 
society" and that whilst "we are to ascertain the meaning of 'trade marks' as in 
1900," trade marks usage in 1900 "gives us the central type; it does not give us 
the circumference of the power" with respect to trade marks provided for by s 
51(xviii).  The centre of the thing named – trade marks – was to be taken with 
the meaning as in 1900 to find the circumference of the power.  However, it 
would be "a mistake to treat the centre as the radius."79  
 
In line with Judge Higgins’s approach, the majority explained that the broad term 
"intellectual effort" embraced a variable, rather than a fixed, constitutional criterion and that 
the "origination" or "breeding" required respectively by the Varieties Act and the Breeder's 
Rights Act involved sufficient "intellectual effort" to enliven the power.80
Judge Kirby, in a separate judgement, advocated an approach different from the 
majority regarding interpretation of the term “patents of inventions”:   
 
The power conferred by s 51(xviii) is a very broad one.  The metes and bounds 
of the power are not to be ascertained in my respectful view, by an 
understanding of what fell within the class of "copyrights, patents of 
inventions and designs, and trade marks" in 1900.  Because, in part of the joint 
reasons the other members of this Court have repeatedly referred to the 
consideration of the ambit of "patents of invention" in 1900 – lest that 
consideration be thought to control, or even significantly to influence, the 
contemporary meaning of the constitutional words, I am bound to express my 
different viewpoint. . . . [the] ultimate criterion was not pre-Federation legal 
understandings but a search for the "essential characteristics" of the words 
used in the Constitution. . . .  The words used in the Constitution, and 
specifically those used in s 51(xviii), are not shackled to the legal 
understandings about the patents power in 1900. . . .  Given the objects of the 
head of power, which include the facilitation and protection of intellectual 
inventiveness within Australia, it would be specially destructive of the 
achievement of those objects if the grant of power were to be attached – even 
as a primary reference point – to the particular notions which, up to 1900, 
“copyrights, patents of inventions and designs and trade marks” had been 
protected by the law. . . .  To the full extent that the language of the 
Constitution warrants and that other important values which it upholds permit, 
meaning should be given to a provision such as s 51(xviii) in a way that allows 
the section to respond to the very great variety of inventiveness that may be 
considered by the Federal Parliament to necessitate protection for the 
“products of intellectual effort.”81
                                                 
78 (1908) 6 C.L.R. 469, 610-11 (Austl.). 
79 Grain Pool, [2000] H.C.A. 14 at para. 19. 
80 Id. at para. 42. 
81 Id. at paras. 90, 103, 132-33, 135 (emphasis added).  Also consider the following passage from Judge Kirby’s 
judgment:  
However, the advent of biogenetically engineered organisms and of inventions in the field of 
information technology have stimulated an apparently increased willingness on the part of 
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C. The Length of Time a Property Right Will Endure 
 
The United States Constitution contains the express words that the IP rights legislated 
should be for “limited Times.”  It could be read to be an explicit guarantee of the public 
domain.  In the recent case of Eldred v. Reno,82 the constitutional validity of the Copyright 
Term Extension Act, 1998 (CTEA)83 legislation extending the U.S. copyright term from life 
of the author plus fifty years to life of the author plus seventy years,84 was questioned.  The 
plaintiffs, who were in the business of publishing materials when copyright had expired, 
argued that the CTEA was unconstitutional for three reasons: 
 
• in both its prospective and retrospective applications the CTEA unjustifiably 
infringes upon freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment; 
• in its application to preexisting works, the CTEA violates the originality 
requirement of the Copyright Clause; 
• in extending the term of subsisting copyrights, the CTEA violates the "limited 
Times" requirement of the Copyright Clause.85  
 
The First Amendment argument, which was rejected, is considered below.  On the issue of 
lack of originality, the court disposed of the issue saying: 
 
The plaintiff’s reason from this that the CTEA cannot extend an extant 
copyright because the copyrighted work already exists and therefore lacks 
originality.  Not so.  Originality is what made the work copyrightable in the 
first place.  A work with a subsisting copyright has already satisfied the 
requirement of originality and need not do so anew for its copyright to persist.  
If the Congress could not extend a subsisting copyright for want of originality, 
it is hard to see how it could provide for a copyright to be renewed at the 
expiration of its initial term -- a practice dating back to 1790 and not 
questioned even by the plaintiffs today.86
 
The plaintiffs were also unsuccessful on the issue of “limited Times.”  The court explained 
that, at widest, if “Congress were [sic] to make copyright protection permanent, then it surely 
would exceed the power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause.”87  It went on to dispose 
of the argument at hand by saying: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
United States courts to recognise the way in which patents and analogous forms of legal 
protection can sometimes encourage technological innovation to the economic and social 
benefit of the United States and beyond. The specific inclusion of s 51(xviii) in the Australian 
Constitution affords a further reason for assigning to s 51(xviii) a meaning that permits the 
protection of "products of intellectual effort" in the variety in which such products now 
manifest themselves and the even greater variety in which they can be expected to appear in 
the future. 
Id. at para. 134. 
82 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
83 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
84 This change was made to bring the U.S. copyright law into line with the EU. 
85 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374. 
86 Id. at 376-77. 
87 Id. at 377. 
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The present plaintiffs want a limit well short of the rule against perpetuities, of 
course.  And they claim to have found it -- or at least a bar to extending the 
life of a subsisting copyright -- in the preamble of the Copyright Clause:  "The 
Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts . . .."  Their idea is that the phrase "limited Times" should be interpreted 
not literally but rather as reaching only as far as is justified by the preambular 
statement of purpose:  If 50 years are enough to "promote . . . Progress," then a 
grant of 70 years is unconstitutional.  Here the plaintiffs run squarely up 
against our holding in Schnapper v. Foley, in which we rejected the argument 
"that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on 
congressional power."  The plaintiffs, however, disclaim any purpose to 
question the holding of Schnapper; indeed, they expressly acknowledge "that 
the preamble of the Copyright Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress' 
legislative power."  Their argument is simply that "the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the terms 'Authors' and 'Writings' in light of that preamble, and that 
this Court should do the same with 'limited Times.'" 
 
The problems with this argument are manifest.  First, one cannot concede that 
the preamble "is not a substantive limit" and yet maintain that it limits the 
permissible duration of a copyright more strictly than does the textual 
requirement that it be for a "limited Time."  Second, although the plaintiffs 
claim that Feist supports using the preamble to interpret the rest of the Clause, 
the Court in Feist never so much as mentions the preamble, let alone suggests 
that the preamble informs its interpretation of the substantive grant of power to 
the Congress (which there turned upon the meaning of "Authors" and of 
"Writings," each standing alone).  Similarly, the Trade-Mark Cases cited in 
Feist rest upon the originality implied by "invention [and] discovery" and by 
the "writings of authors," and make no reference at all to the preamble.88
 
Such reasoning goes close to conflicting with the following statement of the Supreme Court 
in Graham v. John Deere Co.89  “The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not 
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the 
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained 
thereby.”90  It also goes close to conflicting with the following passage from Morton Salt Co. 
v. G.S. Suppiger Co.:91
 
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly carries 
out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right . . .” to their “new and useful” 
inventions.  United States Constitution.  But the public policy which includes 
inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not 
embraced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an 
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and 
which it is contrary to public policy to grant.92
                                                 
88 Id. at 377-78 (citation omitted). 
89 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
90 Id. at 5-6. 
91 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
92 Id. at 492 (citations omitted). 
 19
 
In United States v. Moghadam,93 a case concerning the constitutional validity of the anti-
bootlegging statute (considered in more depth below), the court made note of the apparent 
perpetual duration of the intellectual property rights granted under the statute: 
 
We note that there is another limitation in the Copyright Clause that may be 
implicated by the anti-bootlegging statute:  the "Limited Times" requirement 
that forbids Congress from conferring intellectual property rights of perpetual 
duration.  On its face, the protection created by the anti-bootlegging statute is 
apparently perpetual and contains no express time limit; therefore 
phonorecords of live musical performances would presumably never fall into 
the public domain.  However, because Moghadam has not challenged the 
constitutionality of § 2319A on this basis, we decline to raise the issue sua 
sponte.  Thus, we do not decide in this case whether extending copyright-like 
protection under the anti-bootlegging statute might be fundamentally 
inconsistent with the "Limited Times" requirement of the Copyright Clause, 
and we do not decide in this case whether the Commerce Clause can provide 
the source of Congressional power to sustain the application of the anti-
bootlegging statute in some other case in which such an argument is 
preserved.  We reserve those issues for another day. 94
 
In Canada and Australia the issue of limited times is not assisted by express recognition of 
such a limit in the constitutional mandate.  However, upon further consideration of the matter 
there could be little argument in Australia or Canada with the view that the granting of 
intellectual property rights is in some way limited by the reason for granting those rights.95  
In fact, by way of tradition96 and under International law,97 there are limits – statutory 
intellectual property rights (IPR) are generally of a limited term and in certain circumstances 
subject to uses without permission of the IPR owner – and based on the rationale (even if 
somewhat vague) that allowing monopoly rights in information benefits society as a whole 
through the creation of value added informational products.98  Whether such a balance is 
achieved is a moot point.99  Vaver argues that “[i]f the rights restrict availability and use more 
than they increase them, they are unjustifiable . . ..” 100
 
                                                 
93 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2000). 
94 Id. at 1281 (citations and footnote omitted). 
95 See Australian Trademark Act, 1995, §§17, 72, 75.  Although some may suggest statutory trademarks are of 
perpetual duration it is important to note they are usually only recognised where there is evidence of intended or 
actual use and are registered for a period of ten years, which can be renewed. 
96 See Statute of Anne (1709) 8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.); Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 & 22 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); 
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231-32 (K.B. 1769). 
97 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971).  International law can be used 
to assist in constitutional interpretation in Australia.  See, e.g., Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth [1998] H.C.A. 22 
(Austl.); “Applicant A” v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 142 A.L.R. 331 (Austl.); Kruger v. 
Commonwealth (1997) 146 A.L.R. 126 (Austl.); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 
C.L.R. 513 (Austl.); Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.); Horta v. 
Commonwealth (1994) 181 C.L.R. 183 (Austl.); Bryan Horrigan & Brian F. Fitzgerald, International and 
Transnational Influences on Law and Policy Affecting Government, in Government Law and Policy § 1 (Bryan 
Horrigan ed., 1998). 
98 See Landes, supra note 12 (discussing the utilitarian/economic nature of such thinking); see also Sony, 464 
U.S. at 429-32; Vaver, supra note 19, at 87-96 (noting the relevance of moral rights in Canadian copyright law). 
99 See Vaver, supra note 19, at 6-8. 
100 Id. at 8. 
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In defining a patent, Judge Kirby in Grain Pool, Kirby referred to its limited nature.  
He explained:   
 
Upon this basis, the lawmaking power with respect to "patents of inventions" 
within s 51(xviii) involves the provision by the state to the grantee of 
exclusive rights for a limited time to exploit, and to authorise other persons to 
exploit, a novel object or process of potential benefit to the community in 
respect of which a patent may be granted and which is recorded in a public 
register upon conditions of disclosure.  This is the bedrock.  Nothing more is 
required by the “really essential characteristics” of “patents of inventions.”101
 
While agreeing that the section 51 (xviii) head of power should be read generously, Judge 
Kirby made it clear that intellectual property rights should not be regarded as absolute; they 
must be constructed in the context of their proprietary purpose.  He explained “the protection 
of intellectual property rights must be afforded in a constitutional setting which upholds other 
values of public good in a representative democracy.”102  
In contrast, by suggesting Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution is narrower than section 51 (xviii) in that it requires a purpose of promoting the 
progress of science and the useful arts, the majority in Grain Pool appears to say that a 
variety of intellectual property rights (from low to high intellectual input) can be legislated 
under the section 51 (xviii) head of power.  It is not clear whether the majority is also 
suggesting that these rights, once legislated, have any constitutional limit in the name of the 
public domain.103  Likewise, the following passage from Judge Higgins in the Union Label 
case might suggest that there are no constitutional limits on intellectual property rights:  "The 
power to make laws 'with respect to' these rights involves the power to declare what shall be 
the subject of the rights."104  But that is far from clear. 
Further conjecture on this issue was raised by the High Court in explaining the notion 
of "property" in Yanner v. Eaton:105  
 
It refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law as power permissibly 
exercised over the thing. The concept of "property" may be elusive.  Usually it 
is treated as a "bundle of rights."  But even this may have its limits as an 
analytical tool or accurate description, and it may be, as Professor Gray has 
said, that "the ultimate fact about property is that it does not really exist:  it is 
mere illusion."  Considering whether, or to what extent, there can be property 
in knowledge or information or property in human tissue may illustrate some 
of the difficulties in deciding what is meant by "property" in a subject 
matter.106
 
There is strong indication in this passage that informational rights do have boundaries. 
Furthermore, the passage expressly acknowledges that power is inherent in the notion of 
property. As it is the function of law to mediate power relations in the name of a prosperous, 
                                                 
101 Grain Pool, [2000] H.C.A. 14 at para. 135 (emphasis added). 
102 Id. at n.218. 
103 Id. at para. 32 ("In particular it will be open to the Parliament to pursue its policies by legislation with 
respect to various subject-matters, if one of them appears in s 51 (xviii) on an adequate reading of that text.”).  
Id. 
104 (1908) 6 C.L.R. 469 at 611 (Austl.). 
105 (1999) 201 C.L.R. 351 (Austl.). 
106 Id. at 366; see generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L.J. 1163 (1999) 
(arguing that private property is not a useful analytic concept unless it can be practically bounded). 
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humane and ordered society, one could logically assert that property will have some legally 
defined limits.  
Lessig argues that just as real property has limits, e.g., it can be zoned, so does 
intellectual property, e.g., fair use in copyright law and these limits, when imposed, ensure 
that the collective interest of society to access or use are privileged over the absolute interest 
of the property holder.107  Likewise, Judge Kirby's approach challenges us to conceptualise a 
more principled construct of intellectual property in  accordance with the notion that "no right 
is absolute."108  Are we to expect from such reasoning a view that demands (in a 
constitutional sense) that intellectual property rights must yield to the public domain where 
necessary?  And will such reasoning support the notion that as intellectual property rights 
have had and still do have limited terms (based on a mixture of economic utility and the 
democratic and social value of the public domain),109 the constitutional power to create such 
rights is subject to limits, specifically, a requirement that intellectual property rights be 
granted for limited terms?110  Further, will we see arguments suggesting that there is a 
constitutional guarantee to the public domain?111
The Grain Pool case raises interesting questions concerning intellectual property and 
constitutional principle for the information age.  It shows the willingness of the High Court of 
Australia to allow the Commonwealth or Federal Parliament to legislate on issues of 
intellectual product and gives insight into the variable definition of the term "patents of 
invention."  On this plane, the High Court is clearly saying that, in terms of the federal 
division of legislative powers, the Commonwealth Parliament has a broad power to legislate 
on matters relating to intellectual effort.  On another plane, Judge Kirby's judgement is 
extremely interesting in that it suggests that intellectual property rights do have 
constitutionally defined limits.  In other words, the relationship of power between the 
Commonwealth Parliament and the people in legislating intellectual property rights is not 
absolute.112  In their silence on this issue, the majority raises concerns and uncertainty as to 
the limits of intellectual property rights in the information age.113  We must be mindful that in 
an era when information is a core economic and cultural resource, it is vital as democratic 
                                                 
107 See generally Lessig, supra note 42, at 131-35 (1999) (discussing the limits on the protection of property). 
108 See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (quoting Holmes, J., “The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”). 
109 Brian F. Fitzgerald, Underlying Rationales of Fair Use: Simplifying the Copyright Act, 2 S. Cross U. L. Rev. 
153 (1998), available at http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/lawj (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). 
110 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 42, at 133-34 (explaining that in the United States, exclusive copyrights are 
granted for a limited term in accordance with the United States Constitution, and arguing the term should be 
limited by and linked to the purpose for which the exclusive rights are granted, progressing not hindering the 
useful arts); see generally Eldred, 239 F.3d at 372 (challenging the extension of U.S. copyright term to life of 
the author plus seventy years). 
111 See generally Lessig, supra note 42, at 133-34 (arguing that the public domain is implied in the United States 
Constitution as a consequence of the requirement that exclusive rights be for limited times). 
112 See generally Brian F. Fitzgerald, Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism, 12 U. Tas. L. Rev. 263 
(1993) (discussing the notion of sovereignty in Australian constitutional law). 
113 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules:  A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 
(1999); Benkler, supra note 10; Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We 
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 123 
(1996); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1989); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Conceptualising the Digital Environment, in Going Digital 
2000: Legal Issues for E-Commerce Software and the Internet 1 (Anne Fitzgerald et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998); David Lange, Recognising The Public Domain, 44 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147 
(1981); Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Internet, in The Future of Copyright 
in a Digital Environment 13 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed. 1996). 
 22
principle that the legal process of commodifying information through intellectual property 
law be clearly defined and understood.  
 
 
D. Fixed in a Tangible Medium? 
 
A hallmark of copyright and patent law is that the intellectual knowledge must be 
embodied, manifested or fixed in a tangible medium.  A recent Australian report by the 
Copyright Law Reform Commission suggests that in the realm of copyright law the whole 
notion of fixation in a tangible medium is redundant in the digital age and should be removed 
or at least reconceptualised as a criterion for copyright protection.114  
While there is no express requirement for fixation in a tangible medium in the 
Australian or Canadian Constitutions, the word “writings” in the United States clause implies 
some notion of fixation.  The issue was raised but not finally resolved in Moghadam.  That 
case concerned the constitutional validity of an anti-bootlegging statute115 criminalizing the 
unauthorized recording, transmission to the public, and sale or distribution of or traffic in 
unauthorized recordings of live musical performances.116   Moghadam was convicted of 
violating the statute after he pleaded guilty to knowingly distributing, selling, and trafficking 
in bootleg (unauthorized) compacts discs featuring live musical performances by recording 
artists including Tori Amos and the Beastie Boys.  Moghadam then sought to challenge the 
constitutional validity of the statute arguing it did not fall within any of the federal legislative 
powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.117  The government 
responded that it was constitutional under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce 
Clause.118   The anti-bootlegging statute, which was enacted as a consequence of and in 
implementation of the TRIPS agreement provides in 18 U.S.C. section 2319A that: 
 
(a) Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers involved, 
knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain–  
 
     (1)fixes the sound or sounds and images of a live musical performance in a 
copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a 
performance from an unauthorized fixation;  
 
     (2)transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or sounds 
and images of a live musical performance; or  
 
     (3)distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to 
rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph 
(1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United States;  
 
shall be imprisoned . . . or fined . . . or both . . .. 119
 
                                                 
114 Copyright Law Review Committee, supra note 60, at paras. 5.48-.53. 
115 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
116 Moghadam,175 F.3d at 1271. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1272. 
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The Act also contains a similar provision establishing civil liability for the same conduct but 
omitting the commercial advantage or private financial gain requirement.120  There is little 
legislative history dealing with either provision because the Act was rushed through Congress 
on fast-track procedures, yet what exists suggests that Congress viewed the anti-bootlegging 
provisions as enacted pursuant to its Copyright Clause authority.121
The court explained that the rights created by the anti-bootlegging provisions were 
actually hybrid rights that in some ways resembled the protection of copyright law but in 
other ways were distinct.122  The court explained that it was unclear  whether longstanding 
concepts generally applicable to copyright law such as fair use, the work-for-hire doctrine 
and limited duration, apply to the anti-bootlegging provisions.123  The court noted that in 
contrast to the six exclusive rights of a copyright owner spelled out in 17 U.S.C. section 106, 
it appeared that the only exclusive right created by the anti-bootlegging statute is to record 
and/or re-communicate one's performance.124  For all of those reasons, the court concluded 
that the protection the anti-bootlegging statute confers on musicians is best described as 
"quasi-copyright" or sui generis protection.125  
Judge Anderson, writing the opinion for the court, held the statute to be validly 
enacted under the Commerce Clause.  On the issue of the Copyright Clause, the court 
explained:   
 
This positive grant of legislative authority includes several limitations.  Of 
these limitations, Moghadam has relied in the instant case only on the concept 
of "fixation" which is said to be embedded in the term "Writings."  
 
The concept of fixation suggests that works are not copyrightable unless reduced to some 
tangible form.  "If the word 'writings' is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the 
very least, denote some material form, capable of identification and having a more or less 
permanent endurance."  Of course, the term "Writings" has been interpreted so broadly as to 
include much more than writings in the literal sense, or the lay definition of the word. In fact, 
since a sound recording qualifies as a "Writing" in the constitutional sense, "it is now clear 
that a writing may be perceptible either visually or aurally . . .."  But the fixation requirement 
seems to have persisted through this expansion. Thus, although in the modern era the term 
"Writings" allows Congress to extend copyright protection to a great many things, those 
things have always involved some fixed, tangible and durable form.  
 
Moghadam argues that a live performance, by definition, has not been reduced to a 
tangible form or fixed as of the time of the performance.  Moghadam argues that, but 
for the bootlegger's decision to record, a live performance is fleeting and evanescent.  
 
Because we affirm the conviction in the instant case on the basis of an alternative 
source of Congressional power, we decline to decide in this case whether the fixation 
concept of Copyright Clause can be expanded so as to encompass live performances 
that are merely capable of being reduced to tangible form, but have not been.  For 
                                                 
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). 
121 140th Cong. Rec. H11441, H11457 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes) ("There are a 
number of changes in copyright that will advance our interests in the area of bootlegging, which is going to 
basically protect our country."). 
122 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272. 
123 Id. at 1273. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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purposes of this case, we assume arguendo, without deciding, that the above described 
problems with the fixation requirement would preclude the use of the Copyright 
Clause as a source of Congressional power for the anti-bootlegging statute.126  
 
 
E. The Commerce Clause 
 
The enumerated powers in the United States and Australian Constitutions are 
designed to allocate legislative responsibilities between the federal and state governments.  
They do not necessarily limit governmental power or bestow rights on individuals, although 
clearly one provision in the Australian Constitution does – section 51 (31).  In recent times 
serious arguments have been made – in the context of proposed database legislation and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)127 – that the specific requirements of the IP 
clause define the parameters of the propertization of information through legislative means.128  
In essence, the argument is that the IP clause is both a grant of power and a limitation on 
government power ensuring such fundamental information rights of user and access, such as 
the right to ideas, the public domain and fair use.129  
An even more interesting argument arising from this approach is whether state 
governments are in any way limited by the specific requirements of the IP clause.  In other 
words, does the IP clause in any way preempt state legislation on this topic?  Goldstein held 
that the American states have, subject to preemption by legislation,130 a concurrent power to 
legislate upon intellectual property rights.131  In that case, the Supreme Court implied that the 
states are not constrained by any limits in the federal IP clause as the legislation in question, 
which the Court upheld, allowed perpetual duration of copyright – in contrast to the limited 
times requirement in the federal clause.132  
The clause most likely to undermine the IP clause at the federal level is the 
Commerce Clause.  The United States Commerce Clause reads that Congress has the 
legislative authority “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States . . ..”133  The Australian Commerce Clause reads that the Commonwealth Parliament 
may make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect 
to trade and commerce with other countries and among the States.134
In Moghadam, the court refused to decide whether the anti-bootlegging statute could 
be upheld under the Copyright Clause; they were of the view that it came within the 
Commerce Clause.135  The court reviewed the two opposing precedents in light of the 
Commerce Clause in the face of other clauses and concluded that it was not against the spirit 
of the Constitution to allow the statutes to be upheld under the Commerce Clause.  They 
                                                 
126 175 F.3d at 1273-74. 
127 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1332 (Supp. IV 1998). 
128 See Marci A. Hamilton, Database Protection and the Circuitous Route Around the United States 
Constitution, in International Intellectual Property and the Common Law World (Charles E.F. Rickett & 
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129 See John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 5. 
130 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
131 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560. 
132 Id. at 560-61. 
133 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
134 Aust. Const. § 51(i). 
135 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1269. 
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reasoned that this type of legislation supplemented copyright protection and should be 
allowed.136  
The court started out by confirming that section 2319A concerned conduct that had a 
substantial effect on commerce between the several states and commerce with foreign 
nations, namely the sale of bootleg compact discs.  The court explained that the more 
interesting question was whether Congress could use the Commerce Clause to avoid the 
limitations that might prevent it from passing the same legislation under the Copyright 
Clause.  They explained: 
 
that in general, the various grants of legislative authority contained in the 
Constitution stand alone and must be independently analyzed. In other words, 
each of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and 
what cannot be done under one of them may very well be doable under 
another. 137  
 
The court noted that this general approach had been applied previously in a context involving 
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause, namely, the Trade-Mark Cases.138  In those 
cases, the constitutional validity of an early trademark law enacted by Congress in 1876 was 
at issue.  The Supreme Court held that the Copyright Clause could not sustain the 1876 Act 
because “[t]he ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery,” 
which were the hallmarks of protectable subject matter under the Copyright Clause.139  The 
Court explained that trademarks were inherently commercial; the concept behind the 1876 
Act (and modern trademark law) was not to encourage intellectual and artistic development, 
but rather to protect businesses from predatory behaviour in the marketplace.140  This concept 
was said to be outside the ambit of the legislative power contained in the IP clause.141   
However, that was not the end of the matter and the Supreme Court proceeded to test 
the validity of the statute against the Commerce Clause.  As the Commerce Clause at that 
time was narrowly construed, the legislation was not upheld.  Since that time, an expanding 
view of the ambit of the Commerce Clause means that today the modern variant of this 
trademark law, the Lanham Act, is seen to be an exercise of the commerce clause.142  The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarised this point, saying that “although the 1876 Act 
did not survive due to the restrictive view of the Commerce Clause prevailing at that time, the 
Supreme Court's analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that legislation, 
which would not be permitted under the Copyright Clause, could nonetheless be permitted 
under the Commerce Clause, provided that the independent requirements of the latter are 
met.”143
However, the Court noted that another line of authority stood in contrast to the Trade-
Mark Cases and needed more consideration.  In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. 
Gibbons,144 the Supreme Court considered a statute enacted by Congress that purported to 
alter a pending bankruptcy case by requiring the debtor railroad company's bankruptcy estate 
to pay $75 million to the company's former employees.  That statute directly clashed with the 
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Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution,145 which provides that Congress is 
empowered to pass "uniform" bankruptcy laws, because the law targeted a particular situation 
and was anything but uniform.  The Supreme Court rejected the view that the legislation 
could nevertheless be sustained under the Commerce Clause, which contains no uniformity 
requirement, stating that "if we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact 
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the 
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws."146  The Court 
reconciled the authorities, saying:   
 
We note that there is some tension between the former line of cases (Heart of 
Atlanta, the Trade-Mark Cases and Authors League) and the Railway Labor 
Executives case.  The former cases suggest that in some circumstances the 
Commerce Clause can be used by Congress to accomplish something that the 
Copyright Clause might not allow.  But the Railway Labor Executives case 
suggests that in some circumstances the Commerce Clause cannot be used to 
eradicate a limitation placed upon Congressional power in another grant of 
power.  For purposes of the instant case, we resolve this tension in the 
following manner.  In resolving this tension and in reaching our conclusion in 
this case, we undertake a circumscribed analysis, deciding only what is 
necessary to decide this case, and we reach a narrow conclusion.  First, as 
described above, we hold the anti-bootlegging statute satisfies the "substantial 
effects" test of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Second, 
following the former line of cases (Heart of Atlanta, the Trade-Mark Cases 
and Authors League), we hold that in some circumstances the Commerce 
Clause indeed may be used to accomplish that which may not have been 
permissible under the Copyright Clause.  We hold that the instant case is one 
such circumstance in which the Commerce Clause may be thus used. It is at 
this point that we must resolve the tension with Railway Labor Executives.  
 
Resolving this tension, we take as a given that there are some circumstances, 
as illustrated by Railway Labor Executives, in which the Commerce Clause 
cannot be used by Congress to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congress in 
another grant of power.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the instant 
case is not one such circumstance.  We hold that the Copyright Clause does 
not envision that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-
like protection under other constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce 
Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement 
inherent in the term "Writings."  The grant itself is stated in positive terms, 
and does not imply any negative pregnant that suggests that the term 
"Writings" operates as a ceiling on Congress' ability to legislate pursuant to 
other grants. Extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical 
performances is in no way inconsistent with the Copyright Clause, even if that 
Clause itself does not directly authorize such protection.  Quite the contrary, 
extending such protection actually complements and is in harmony with the 
existing scheme that Congress has set up under the Copyright Clause.  A live 
musical performance clearly satisfies the originality requirement.  Extending 
quasi-copyright protection also furthers the purpose of the Copyright Clause to 
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promote the progress of the useful arts by securing some exclusive rights to 
the creative author.  Finally, with respect to the fixation requirement, upon 
which this opinion focuses, although a live musical performance may not have 
been fixed, or reduced to tangible form, as of the time the bootleg copy was 
made, it certainly was subject to having been thus fixed.  Our conclusion that 
extending copyright-like protection in the instant case is not fundamentally 
inconsistent with the fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause is bolstered 
by an example from the prior copyright law.  If a live performance is 
broadcast, e.g., by radio or television, and simultaneously recorded by the 
performer, any unauthorized recording by a person receiving the broadcast 
constitutes copyright infringement of the sound recording or motion picture, 
notwithstanding that the infringer actually copied the live performance 
directly, and not the fixation thereof.  This result is based upon the last 
sentence of the definition of "fixed" in 17 U.S.C. § 101.  That last sentence 
provides:  "A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being 
made simultaneously with its transmission."  This definition creates a legal 
fiction that the simultaneous fixation occurs before the transmission and the 
unauthorized recording. . . .  While we are aware that the constitutionality of 
this aspect of the statute has never been tested, the ease with which it has been 
incorporated into the prior copyright law suggests that fixation, as a 
constitutional concept, is something less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to 
Congressional power.  Indeed, if a performer under the prior law could 
effectively protect a live musical performance, circumventing the fixation 
requirement, simply by the device of simultaneous recordation, the anti-
bootlegging law seems to us like more of an incremental change than a 
constitutional breakthrough. Common sense does not indicate that extending 
copyright-like protection to a live performance is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the Copyright Clause.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that extending copyright-like 
protection in the instant case is not fundamentally inconsistent with the 
fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause.  By contrast, the nonuniform 
bankruptcy statute at issue in Railway Labor Executives was irreconcilably 
inconsistent with the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution. 147
 
The question remains as to whether a sui generis database law enacted pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause would survive constitutional challenge.  The argument would be made that 
the IP clause requires originality (a modicum of creativity and something that emanates from 
the author) and that allowing information to be propertized in situations where originality is 
not evident would be unconstitutional.148  The focus of the argument is whether the IP clause 
sets the parameters for propertizing information through its specific requirements.  One 
problem with this approach is that the IP clause was established in another era.  Nowadays, 
information is a lifeblood, both in social and economic terms, and it is conceivable that new 
ways of propertizing information have emerged and will continue to emerge that will demand 
protection; yet the IP clause may not be up to this challenge in conceptualisation.  A 
                                                 
147 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279-81. 
148 See supra note 128. 
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consequence of limiting the Commerce Clause in this respect may be that interested parties 
will resort to the states to enact their legislation (difficult, in the face of section 301 of the 
Copyright Act).  This may result in less than desirable outcomes.  While it is clear that 
restricting the scope of the Commerce Clause in the face of the IP clause has merit and legal 
precedent to support it, an over-zealous implementation of such a principle could mortify 
constitutional interpretation, stifle incentive to create and ensuing innovation and retard 
thinking about new forms of digital property. 
 In Australia, a similar question concerning the commerce clause and IP clause could 
arise although the specific requirements of the U.S. clause are not explicit and possibly not 
implicit in the Australian clause.  This is nevertheless a dormant issue that needs to be 
considered when legislating in this area.149  
In summary, note that specific limits inherent in the IP clause may be asserted in 
constitutional litigation.  The law in light of Moghadam appears to suggest that specific limits 
pertaining to the IP clause will limit the Commerce Clause in certain cases and that this might 
be an obstacle for any sui generis database law in the United States.  
 
 
II.  The Constitutional Imperative:  Free Speech, Access to Information and Democratic 
Principle 
 
The second dimension of traditional constitutional principle that promises to define, if 
not influence, the boundary of digital property is that of free speech:  constitutionally and 
expressly enshrined in the United States First Amendment, and Article 2 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights150 and, existing to a limited and implied degree, in the context of political 
speech in Australia.151 As to this point, the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which has been vigorously asserted in recent times by advocates fearful of 
growing intellectual property rights, has not been considered by the courts to be of overriding 
concern.   
This is not to say that free speech considerations have not influenced the development 
and implementation of intellectual property law.  The notion of free speech is implicated in 
the definition or construction of digital property because we use 
copyrighted/patented/trademarked items in the process of communicating – in constructing 
knowledge and meaning.  The most obvious example might be when I copy an image and 
display it on my website.  If that use is purely commercial then any chance of a fair dealing or 
fair use defence is weak, yet the more its shades into political or social commentary or 
research the more likely we are to have an allowable use.  
Software which is integral to the digital communicative process is also an interesting 
example.  Software is a form of discourse, making things manifest or allowing them to be 
seen; it is part of the speech or communicative process in the digital environment.  If I 
propertize software through copyright or patent, I allow a certain degree of control over 
communication. 
In the United States, those adamant that IP rights must accommodate the necessity of 
consuming information and democratically distributed intelligence – the cultural or social 
aspects as opposed to the economics of information – have focussed on First Amendment 
                                                 
149 See Australian Tape Mfrs. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 176 C.L.R. 480 (Austl.) (while the general 
rule is that each head of legislative power stands alone, the High Court has interpreted section 51 (xxxi) of the 
Australian Constitution (the Australian version of the U.S. Takings Clause) as both a grant of power and a 
limitation on other powers in certain circumstances). 
150 See Fewer, supra note 19, at 226-39. 
151 See Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. (1997) 145 A.L.R. 96 (Austl.). 
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arguments.  In order to speak and communicate or think and construct knowledge in the new 
digital environment, we need to be able to access and distribute information.  “A broad 
dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual information is crucial to the robust public 
debate and informed citizenry that are ‘the essence of self-government.’  And every citizen 
must be permitted freely to marshal ideas and facts in the advocacy of particular political 
choices."152  This is the essence of the debate, although the desire for informational liberty or 
diversity is not limited to just the political realm but also encompasses the economic, social 
and cultural plane. 
 
 
A. Reconciling Free Speech and Copyright 
 
In Harper & Row Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the United States Supreme Court 
explained “[t]he Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 
"[strikes] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression."  No 
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”153  In another passage the Court 
referred to "copyright as the engine of free expression," as it gave incentive for people to 
express ideas.154  The existence of the fair use, along with other exceptions, was also 
important.155
The defendants in Harper & Row had extracted/copied 300 words from former 
President Gerald Ford’s biography, before it was published, ruining a deal that had been 
made with Time Magazine to do a pre-publication piece of 12,000 words.  The Supreme 
Court held that copying 300 words was not a fair use as it contained the most sensational 
details, including information about former President Nixon’s pardon (quality not quantity 
mattered here), and ruined an aspect of the commercial exploitation of the work.  The 
defendants argued for a special public figure or interest exception on top of fair use that 
would allow copyrighted work to be used in social communication.  The Court rejected that 
argument, noting that copyright was itself an engine of free expression making it possible and 
rewarding for people to invest in the development and dissemination of ideas.156  As the Act 
stood, there was sufficient reconciliation of the commodifying or propertizing of information 
through copyright and the notion of free speech. 
The First Amendment challenge to intellectual property legislation was dealt a further 
blow in the Eldred decision when the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia endorsed and reaffirmed the holding in Harper & Row that the Copyright Act and 
the First Amendment are adequately reconciled through the notions of the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use (along with other permissive use) doctrine(s).157  In other words, 
since the Copyright Act protects expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves, there is 
technically no barrier to any communicative activity.  Furthermore, fair use makes socially 
necessary material available in the face of the exclusive rights of the owner.  
In Eldred, the plaintiffs argued that the CTEA violated the First Amendment and was 
unconstitutional.158  The Court explained:   
                                                 
152 Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting ) (quoting 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)). 
153 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
154 Id. at 558. 
155 Id. at 560. 
156 Id. at 558. 
157 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375. 
158 Id. at 374. 
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The decisions of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises and of this court in United Video, Inc. v. FCC, stand as 
insuperable bars to plaintiffs' first amendment theory.  In Harper & Row the 
Court held that a magazine's advance publication of excerpts from the 
memoirs of former President Gerald Ford infringed the copyright thereon.  In 
doing so the Court explained how the regime of copyright itself respects and 
adequately safeguards the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment. . . . The [F]irst [A]mendment objection of the magazine was 
misplaced "[i]n view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in 
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and 
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment 
traditionally afforded by fair use."  In keeping with this approach, we held in 
United Video that copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under 
the First Amendment.  There, certain cable companies petitioned for review of 
an FCC regulation providing that the supplier of a syndicated television 
program could agree to the program being broadcast exclusively by a single 
station in a local broadcast area.  We rejected the first amendment aspect of 
their challenge as follows: 
 
In the present case, the petitioners desire to make commercial use of 
the copyrighted works of others.  There is no first amendment right to do so.  
Although there is some tension between the Constitution's [C]opyright 
[C]lause and the first amendment, the familiar idea/expression dichotomy of 
copyright law, under which ideas are free but their particular expression can 
be copyrighted, has always been held to give adequate protection to free 
expression.159
 
The plaintiffs argued that those authorities were restricted solely to the narrow case 
where a litigant demands a right to use otherwise legitimately copyrighted material, which 
was distinct from the litigation at hand that sought to challenge the constitutional validity of 
the Copyright Act itself.  The Court rejected this purported distinction as being “totally 
illusory.”160  The Court explained, “the relevant question under the First Amendment – 
regardless whether it arises as a defence in a suit for copyright infringement or in an 
anticipatory challenge to a statute or regulation – is whether the party has a First Amendment 
interest in a copyrighted work.”161   
The type of argument or justification for reconciling copyright and the First 
Amendment given in Harper & Row and Eldred is more difficult to sustain when a law 
proposes to protect facts or eliminates fair use.  The European Database Directive of 1996 
protects facts and gives very limited fair use rights, as do proposed database laws currently 
before the U.S. Congress.  How might they stand up in the face of a First Amendment 
challenge?  The scrutiny or balancing process here will be interesting.  Furthermore, 
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes,162 concerning the operation of the DMCA, suggests that 
the DMCA can act to protect facts and eliminate fair use rights where a technological 
protection measure is in place.163  The DMCA does this by prohibiting actual circumvention 
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of an access control and by prohibiting providing, offering or otherwise trafficking in a 
device that will circumvent an effective technological access or copy protection measure.164  
It is no defence to this law to argue that the circumvention has taken place in order to make 
fair use of material behind the technological protection measure or to gain access to raw data 
or facts behind the technological protection measure.165  
In Reimerdes, the issue of free speech was raised in the context of the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions.  The Content Scrambling System (CSS) was a form of encryption 
used to protect DVDs from being played on unauthorised players.  An authorised DVD 
player, which included a computer running Microsoft Windows, would allow the DVD to be 
played but not copied.  In order to allow people to speak in different digital voices, namely 
the Linux open code operating system, DeCSS was released.  Initially, the 2600 website 
made the program available from their site, but after an interim injunction was issued they 
removed it from their site and linked to other sites.  Judge Kaplan held that they breached the 
DMCA by providing or otherwise trafficking in a device that circumvents a technological 
protection measure.166
One series of arguments in the case, which is now on appeal to the second circuit, was 
that the DMCA was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, as it restricted the 
expression of the computer code.  Judge Kaplan held that while code in object or source code 
can be speech for First Amendment purposes, that does not mean it cannot be regulated.167  
He explained that while the code is expressive, the behaviour it causes is functional and the 
functional aspect of speech can be regulated even if it has an incidental impact on the 
expressive aspect.168  He explained that regulation of the functional aspect of speech is 
content neutral, not content specific, and therefore only requires an intermediate, as opposed 
to a strict, level of scrutiny.169  The government objective here was to prevent large scale 
copyright piracy in the digital environment – this was a legitimate objective and the scrutiny 
was satisfied.  
I suggest the judge understated the discursive aspect of the functional behaviour of 
code.  Code expressed as 1s and 0s is expressive, it is a literary text for copyright purposes – 
that much is obvious.  But the behaviour that the code causes is not just functional, it is also 
communicative and discursive.  The behaviour created by this code allowed the people using 
DeCSS to talk, communicate or consume information in differently coded speech, namely 
Linux.  It may be that this communicative activity can be regulated because it could lead to 
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unlawful activity, but that is a question for further consideration and it may be more crucial in 
other cases.  We need to keep in mind that software is not just code, it is discourse; it is not 
just a noun, it is also a verb.  Software allows us to see and say things in digital space. Its 
expressive or discursive potential is not just in code written as static text but in the running 
code, allowing and facilitating people to move and consume information.  Software is 
designed to process information – that is its entire function – so function here is integrally 
linked with communication,  information and knowledge.  
In Canada, there has been no success in invalidating the Copyright Act against the 
freedom of communication in Article 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  It has been 
suggested that in Canada the idea /expression dichotomy is not sufficient to ensure free 
speech, especially in the absence of a broad based fair use doctrine.170  Canada, like Australia 
and the UK, has a much more limited and specific fair dealing doctrine.171  In Australia, there 
seems little doubt that the implied freedom of political communication could be invoked in a 
challenge to the Copyright Act in an instance of political discourse.  Short of that, free speech 
considerations will need to be advocated through the interpretation of copyright law.  In 
Grain Pool,172 Judge Kirby explained: 
 
The protection of intellectual property rights must be afforded in a 
constitutional setting which upholds other values of public good in a 
representative democracy.  In the United States the relevant head of 
constitutional power has been viewed as containing in-built limitations many 
of which are derived from the competing constitutional objective of public 
access to information.  In Australia, the constitutional setting is different but 
the existence of competing constitutional objectives, express and implied, is 
undoubted. 173
 
The message from this passage is that intellectual property rights are subject to constitutional 
limits; yet, can it be suggested that fundamental democratic principles such as public access 
to information might act to influence the ultimate shape of copyright or information law? 
There is a deeper question concerning the social, as opposed to economic, aspect of 
innovation in this entire debate.  It revolves around a fundamental (engineering) principle of 
diversity in knowledge creation or distributed intelligence that is the hallmark of a democratic 
society.  The notion of “diversity” stems from the cases of Associated Press v. United 
States174 and Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. FCC,175 where the United States Supreme 
Court explained:  "The basic tenet of national communication policy is that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
welfare of the public."176  This ethic also underpins the First Amendment.177  A fundamental 
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engineering principle of social and cultural communication pathways is that of diversity – 
monopoly of thought will not assist a pluralistic and tolerant society fuelled by distributed 
intelligence.  For now the challenge by the First Amendment to the Copyright Act or the 
Patent Act has yet to be fully realised.  This is not to say the arguments will never prosper.  
The assertion of free and open discursive frameworks that will allow diversity of opinion is 
of paramount importance to any society wishing to encourage independent thoughts and 
distributed (as opposed to centrally created) intelligence. 
And as digital property is much more essential to communication than real property 
has ever been, the cultural aspect of its construction will continue to be highlighted.  At 
present, though, these arguments are not eagerly received. The more fruitful area for debate is 
in relation to the general law defining and refining digital property.  
 
 
III.  The Defining Aspects of General (as Opposed to Constitutional) Statutory or 
Common Law 
 
While a digital property right might be constitutional pursuant to the Copyright and 
Patent Clause or the Commerce Clause and survive First Amendment scrutiny in the United 
States, Article 2 in Canada, or the implied right to free political speech in Australia, it will 
still take definition from other principles of ordinary or general (as opposed to constitutional) 
law.  In particular, digital property rights must “fit”178 with other fundamental principles of 
general law, some of which exhibit a constitutional-like presence in terms of tradition and 
content. 
Much of the specific definition of intellectual property law comes through statutes.  
My aim here is not to rehash those laws in detail but to look more at laws that limit those 
positive grants of property.  There are a number of principles of law that act to encumber 
digital property rights with an obligation of “diversity.”  This notion is the same as explained 
above in relation to free speech.  Principles of general law, like antitrust/competition, 
copyright fair use doctrine (e.g., reverse engineering of software) and copyright misuse 
doctrine act to prevent extreme monopolisation or control of informational products by any 
one person.  These principles of general law are dynamic in the sense that they capture the 
imagination and confidence of the courts and have been much more successful in harnessing 
the untold power of digital property rights. We must look more closely at this area of law, as 
much of the construction of digital property as played out in the courts is being undertaken in 
this space.   
These laws also make an important statement about principles in our legal system and 
the notion of constitutionalism.  Principles of law provide us with guidelines for 
regulating/mediating an exercise of power.  They come in the traditional constitutional 
variety (relating to an exercise of government power:  vertical constitutionalism), but also in 
a much more “private sphere” common law or statutory variety:  horizontal constitutionalism. 
Examples of the latter are common law principles such as reasonable care, unconscionability 
and unjust enrichment or statutory principles such as antitrust and fair use/dealing.  While 
                                                                                                                                                        
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that 
with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of 
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion 
is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government. 
 
178 See Burnie Port Auth. v. Gen. Jones Pty. Ltd. (1994) 179 C.L.R. 520 (Austl.); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire (Harvard University Press 1986).  
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this group of principles is not seen as constitutional law in the strict sense, they represent 
principles of constitutionalism (guidelines for regulating power relations)179 and will be 
increasingly important in this form of conceptualization to the development of a theory of 
digital constitutionalism (discussed below).  In short, non-constitutional principles of 
ordinary or general law as laid out in statutes or judicial decisions will bring definition to 
digital property.  The interstices of ordinary law and the Dworkinian notion of “fit” bring 
much understanding to the defining process of digital property.180
 
 
A. Antitrust/Competition Law 
 
There is an inherent tension between IP law that creates a form of monopoly and 
antitrust or competition law that monitors the power of monopolies in the market place.181  It 
is becoming increasingly apparent that digital property will take a significant aspect of its 
definition from antitrust law or similar doctrines like copyright misuse, which is a defence to 
an action in copyright. 
Antitrust or competition law, then, is the first fundamental principle to consider. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act182 provides that a monopolist should not seek to grow or 
maintain183  a monopoly through anti-competitive conduct.  Section 46 of the Australian 
Trade Practices Act says that someone possessing substantial market power should not take 
advantage of that power to lessen competition, while in Europe an entity should not abuse a 
dominant position in the market.184  
Understanding the scope and function of these laws depends on understanding their 
purpose.  There are at least two reasons for adopting competition laws:185
 
1) to facilitate diversity of economic actors in the market place – suggesting a 
number of small or medium players rather than monopolies and; 
2) to ensure economic efficiency leading to an optimisation of consumer 
welfare – suggesting a market place that provides the best economic 
outcomes for consumers 
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184 See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.). 
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The first rationale promotes diversity while the second promotes economic efficiency, in 
terms of economic welfare. 
Many subscribe to the view that the Sherman Act was enacted to protect the existence 
of small or medium size businesses in the face of monopolies.186  However, under the 
influence of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, antitrust law is nowadays more 
frequently conceptualized in terms of the economic efficiency of market practices with 
consumer welfare as an economic issue being the ultimate criterion.187  The economic 
efficiency approach at points seems to ignore political and social aspects of the market.188  In 
Australia, section 2 of the Trade Practices Act provides:  “The object of this Act is to enhance 
the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and 
provision for consumer protection.”189  
David McGowan has recently written190 about the competing rationales of U.S. 
antitrust law in light of the Microsoft191 decision.  He ponders whether the decision is really 
about guaranteeing the existence of smaller firms and competition in the market place or 
whether it is about total economic efficiency analysed through producer and consumer 
equations and evidenced in optimal costs and pricing.192  He argues that Judge Jackson in the 
Microsoft case seemed to want to invoke both notions.193  He questions whether 
“innovation,” as invoked in antitrust reasoning, is a pursuit of many small players in the 
market or the pursuit of best possible outcomes in terms of economic welfare.194  
So what is it that we really want from antitrust law – diversity or optimal consumer 
welfare? The two are not necessarily congruent.  If we choose diversity as the touchstone, the 
exploitation of intellectual property rights will be defined in this light and we may see courts 
more willing to facilitate a broader range of access to informational products than we would 
under an economic efficiency approach. And if we marry a cultural theory of intellectual 
property law with a cultural theory of antitrust law, we are almost certain to see differently 
constructed digital property rights than if economic theory was the motivating force. 
While antitrust or competition law may be seen by many to now rest in the lap of 
economic analysis, there can be little doubt that growing proprietary rights in digital 
architecture, such as software, which forms the basis of modern communication (form and 
content), are demanding that a diversity of communication pathways be opened.195  The role 
of antitrust law in ensuring diversity of information and knowledge (in the mould of the First 
Amendment) is clearly articulated in the following passage from the Associated Press case:  
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The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of 
the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary.  That 
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of 
the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society.  Surely a command 
that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not 
afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon 
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.  Freedom to publish means freedom 
for all and not for some.  Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.  
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First 
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private 
interests.196
 
This passage, which some might suggest is outdated and others might characterise as 
timeless, highlights that welfare of the public is a social and not just an economic issue and 
that private corporations in their exercise of power are subject to constitutional like principles 
(another aspect of the notion of digital constitutionalism) of diversity rooted in antitrust law.  
Here lies an extremely important point.  Access and user rights to – consumption of – 
information and the ensuing construction of knowledge should never be the domain of one 
entity, public or private.  Competition law has the potential to implement such a principle 
and, if it is invoked in this manner, it will be central to the definition of digital property. 
 
 
1. “Refusal to Deal” 
 
One of the crucial issues that does much to define the scope of digital property is the 
extent to which someone can refuse to supply their property to a particular customer.  This 
issue is usually much more delicate where the supplier has an intellectual property right 
(copyright or patent) to enforce the refusal to supply.  In an environment where private 
corporations are making the highways and languages of the digital world, it becomes 
frightening to think they have the power to refuse entry to digital discourse.  
“Refusal to deal”197 has been considered in a number of cases.198  In essence, it means 
that the supplier wishes to discriminate against a particular purchaser, normally for strategic 
business reasons, but also potentially for discrimination on the basis of ideology.  Generally, 
as a matter of contract law, we can refuse to sell tangible property to someone so long as we 
                                                 
196 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. 
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).  There, the district court stated:   
That interest [of the news industry to present a diversity of opinion] is closely akin to, if 
indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that 
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through 
any kind of authoritative selection.  To many this is, and always will be, folly: but we have 
staked upon it our all. 
Id. 
197 That is, the right to refuse to sell a product to someone. 
198 Compare Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (stating that in terms of non-intellectual 
property protected products in a continuing relationship, refusal to sell may be an antitrust violation) and Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) with Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 
F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that a refusal to license a patent or sell a patented item without more 
could not be an antitrust violation) and In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); cf., Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that such 
a refusal may be an antitrust violation). 
 37
do not infringe discrimination laws concerning things such as race, sex and religion.  That 
kind of strategic business discrimination is generally seen as part of the ethical cycle of 
business, and is confirmed in Melway Publishing Pty. Ltd. v. Robert Hicks Pty. Ltd.199  
However, there is a fine line as to when this becomes unjustifiable anti-competitive conduct.  
In the United States, in cases of a continuous relationship, this will be more likely to 
infringe.200
The recent Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation201 decision 
highlights some of these issues.  In that case, Xerox made high volume copiers and had 
adopted a policy of refusing to sell parts that were unique to its “Series 10” copiers to 
independent service organizations ("ISOs"), including the company CSU, unless they were 
also end users of such copiers.202  The policy was expanded in 1987 to include all new 
products and the older “Series 9” copiers.203  In 1989, the enforcement of the policy was 
tightened, which resulted in Xerox cutting off CSU's ability to directly purchase restricted 
parts.204  Xerox “also implemented an ‘on-site, end user verification’ procedure to confirm 
that the parts ordered by certain ISOs or their customers were actually for their end user 
use.”205  That policy was applied to CSU, one of the more successful ISOs.206  
In order to keep servicing Xerox equipment, CSU:  used parts from used Xerox 
equipment; used parts obtained from other ISOs and used parts purchased from customers.207 
In addition, CSU also obtained parts from Rank Xerox, a European Xerox affiliate, until 
Xerox stopped that practice.208  Xerox settled an antitrust lawsuit with some ISOs and agreed 
to suspend its restrictive parts policy and to license its diagnostic software for agreed upon 
periods.209  CSU opted out of that settlement and filed suit, alleging that Xerox violated the 
Sherman Act by setting the prices on its patented parts much higher for ISOs than for end 
users in an attempt to force ISOs to raise prices.210 By that, the alleged violation would then 
eliminate ISOs, including CSU, as competitors in the market of high-speed copiers and 
printers.  Xerox responded with patent and copyright infringement counterclaims and also 
contested CSU's antitrust claims because they relied on injuries that they alleged were solely 
caused by the refusal to sell and license patented parts and copyrighted software, which 
Xerox considered lawful.211  
In dismissing the antitrust claims against Xerox, the court explained: 
  
Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the 
antitrust laws. "But it is also correct that the antitrust laws do not negate the 
patentee's right to exclude others from patent property.". . .  
A patent alone does not demonstrate market power. … 
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The patentee's right to exclude, however, is not without limit.  As we 
recently observed in Glass Equipment Development Inc. v. Besten, Inc., a 
patent owner who brings suit to enforce the statutory right to exclude others 
from making, using, or selling the claimed invention is exempt from the 
antitrust laws, even though such a suit may have an anticompetitive effect, 
unless the infringement defendant proves one of two conditions.  First, he may 
prove that the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful fraud 
within the meaning of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & 
Chemical Corp.  Or he may demonstrate that the infringement suit was a mere 
sham to cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.  Here, CSU makes no claim 
that Xerox obtained its patents through fraud in the Patent and Trademark 
Office; the Walker Process analysis is not implicated.  
 . . . .  
. . . We therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation for 
exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his 
patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect, so long as that 
anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent 
grant.  It is the infringement defendant and not the patentee that bears the 
burden to show that one of these exceptional situations exists and, in the 
absence of such proof, we will not inquire into the patentee's motivations for 
asserting his statutory right to exclude.  Even in cases where the infringement 
defendant has met this burden, which CSU has not, he must then also prove 
the elements of the Sherman Act violation.212
 
The court then turned to the issue of copyright, stating:   
 
The Copyright Act expressly grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to  
distribute the protected work by "transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending."  "[T]he owner of the copyright, if [it] pleases, may refrain from 
vending or licensing and content [itself] with simply exercising the right to 
exclude others from using [its] property."  
The Supreme Court has made clear that the property right granted by 
copyright law cannot be used with impunity to extend power in the 
marketplace beyond what Congress intended.  The Court has not, however, 
directly addressed the antitrust implications of a unilateral refusal to sell or 
license copyrighted expression.  
The Tenth Circuit has not addressed in any published opinion the extent to 
which the unilateral refusal to sell or license copyrighted expression can form 
the basis of a violation of the Sherman Act.  We are therefore left to determine 
how that circuit would likely resolve the issue; the precedent of other circuits 
is instructive in that consideration.  The Fourth Circuit has rejected a claim of 
illegal tying, supported only by evidence of a unilateral decision to license 
copyrighted diagnostic software to some but not to others.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court recognized the copyright owner's exclusive right to "sell, 
rent, lease, lend, or otherwise distribute copies of a copyrighted work," and 
concluded that "Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not entitle `a purchaser . . . 
to buy a product that the seller does not wish to offer for sale.'" 
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Perhaps the most extensive analysis of the effect of a unilateral refusal 
to license copyrighted expression was conducted by the First Circuit in Data 
General Corp. v. Gruman Systems Support Corp.  There, the court noted that 
the limited copyright monopoly is based on Congress' empirical assumption 
that the right to "exclude others from using their works creates a system of 
incentives that promotes consumer welfare in the long term by encouraging 
investment in the creation of desirable artistic and functional works of 
expression. . . . We cannot require antitrust defendants to prove and reprove 
the merits of this legislative assumption in every case where a refusal to 
license a copyrighted work comes under attack."  The court went on to 
establish as a legal standard that "while exclusionary conduct can include a 
monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to 
exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid 
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers."  The burden to 
overcome this presumption was firmly placed on the antitrust plaintiff. The 
court gave no weight to evidence showing knowledge that developing a 
proprietary position would help to maintain a monopoly in the service market 
in the face of contrary evidence of the defendant's desire to develop state-of- 
the-art diagnostic software to enhance its service and consumer benefit.  
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit adopted a modified version of this Data 
General standard.  Both courts agreed that the presumption could be rebutted 
by evidence that "the monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual 
property laws in an unlawful manner."  The Ninth Circuit, however, extended 
the possible means of rebutting the presumption to include evidence that the 
defense and exploitation of the copyright grant was merely a pretextual 
business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct. … This is in reality a 
significant departure from the First Circuit's central premise that rebutting the 
presumption would be an uphill battle and would only be appropriate in those 
rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the 
objectives of the Copyright Act.  
We believe the First Circuit's approach is more consistent with both the 
antitrust and the copyright laws and is the standard that would most likely be 
followed by the Tenth Circuit in considering the effect of Xerox's unilateral 
right to refuse to license or sell copyrighted manuals and diagnostic software 
on liability under the antitrust laws.  We therefore reject CSU's invitation to 
examine Xerox's subjective motivation in asserting its right to exclude under 
the copyright laws for pretext, in the absence of any evidence that the 
copyrights were obtained by unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly 
power beyond the statutory copyright granted by Congress.  In the absence of 
such definitive rebuttal evidence, Xerox's refusal to sell or license its 
copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the 
copyright holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.213
 
Both of these passages highlight the delicate interplay between intellectual property law, 
antitrust law and the constitutionally enumerated grant of power.  The ambit of the copyright 
or patent is defined by the meaning of antitrust law, but antitrust law is also confined by the 
ambit of copyright and patent.  One may refuse access to or use of an informational product 
or digital property, even where someone is willing to pay market price, so long as one does 
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not engage in anti-competitive conduct.  The questions then return to what anti-competitive 
conduct means and what is the desired or legislated role of antitrust law. 
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.214 is another case addressing refusal to deal.  In that 
case, Intel, a manufacturer of computer microprocessors, supplied Intergraph, an original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM), with microprocessors for their computer workstations.215  
Intel saw Intergraph as a special customer and  provided Intergraph with various special 
benefits, including proprietary information and products, under non-disclosure agreements.216  
Through a series of events in November 1997, Intergraph sued Intel for infringement of the 
certain patents that it held.217  In this litigation, Intergraph also sought an injunction to stop 
Intel from cutting off the supply of benefits to Intergraph.218  Intel opposed this motion and 
Intergraph amended their claim to say that Intel was in violation of antitrust laws, basically 
on the basis that it refused to deal its information to Intergraph, even though Intergraph was 
suing it on other grounds for patent infringement.219  The question was, in essence, is it 
legitimate to refuse to supply someone with your informational value in the face of suit by 
them on other grounds? 
The district court enjoined Intel from refusing to supply information and Intel 
appealed, arguing that no law required it to give such special benefits, including its trade 
secrets, proprietary information, intellectual property, pre-release products, allocation of new 
products and other preferences, to an entity that was suing it on charges of multiple 
wrongdoings.220  
The court noted that Intergraph and Intel operated in different markets and were not 
competitors.221  While Intel might hold a large share of the market for microprocessors, it 
could not be held liable for growing its monopoly through anti-competitive conduct by a non-
competitor or consumer.222  Intergraph also claimed that Intel’s information was an essential 
facility and that it should be allowed access to it.223 The essential facility doctrine provides an 
obligation to deal/supply but usually relates to core tangible infrastructure, like railway lines 
or electricity wires.  In the information age there have been a number of claims that core 
infrastructure of the information society is an essential facility and cannot be closed off from 
use.224  
The court explained the notion of an essential facility as follows: 
   
 The "essential facility" theory of Sherman Act violation stems from 
United States v. Terminal RR Ass'n, wherein a group of railroads formed an 
association that controlled the railroad terminals, bridges, and switching yards 
serving the City of St. Louis.  The Court held that this association was formed 
for an anticompetitive purpose, that the railroad terminals, bridges, and yards 
were facilities essential to competing railroads, and that section 1 of the 
Sherman Act was violated.   
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The district court found that "the Advance Chips Samples and advance 
design and technical information are essential products and information 
necessary for Intergraph to compete in its markets."  Reasoning that "[t]he 
antitrust laws impose on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to 
make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms," the court held that 
Intel's action in withdrawing these benefits violated the Sherman Act.  As 
authority the district court cited Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States and 
MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
. . . . 
In MCI Communications, the court enumerated the elements of liability 
under the "essential facilities" theory as "(1) control of the essential facility by 
a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate 
the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; 
and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."  The courts have well 
understood that the essential facility theory is not an invitation to demand 
access to the property or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties 
and compulsion; thus the courts have required anticompetitive action by a 
monopolist that is intended to "eliminate competition in the downstream 
market."225
 
Ultimately, the court concluded this was not an essential facility scenario as Intel and 
Intergraph were not competitors and then moved on to reject the notion that Intel had done 
something wrong in refusing to supply its informational products to Intergraph:  
 
Other than as a remedy for illegal acts, the antitrust laws do not compel a 
company to do business with anyone -- customer, supplier, or competitor.  
 
. . . [I]t is well established that "in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent 
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." 
  . . . .  
A "refusal to deal" may raise antitrust concerns when the refusal is directed against 
competition and the purpose is to create, maintain, or . . . enlarge a monopoly.  For example, 
in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, the only newspaper in town refused to sell newspaper 
advertising to persons who also advertised on a competing radio station; this was held to be 
an attempt to . . . monopolize the mass dissemination of all news and advertising, and to 
violate the Sherman Act.226
 
Claims of leveraging (using monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage in another 
market through illegitimate conduct), coercive reciprocity and tying (based on the allegation 
that Intel would supply the information if Intergraph settled the law suit) were also rejected 
by the court.227  
 
Finally, the court more closely considered the issue of intellectual property rights.  The court 
explained: 
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In response to Intel's argument that its proprietary information and pre-
release products are subject to copyright and patents, the district court 
observed that Intel's intellectual property "does not confer upon it a privilege 
or immunity to violate the antitrust laws."  That is of course correct.  But it is 
also correct that the antitrust laws do not negate the patentee's right to exclude 
others from patent property.  The patent and antitrust laws are complementary, 
the patent system serving to encourage invention and the bringing of new 
products to market by adjusting investment-based risk, and the antitrust laws 
serving to foster industrial competition.  The patent and antitrust laws serve 
the public in different ways, both of importance to the nation.  
  . . . . 
In Image Technical Services the Ninth Circuit reported that it had found "no 
reported case in which a court had imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral 
refusal to sell or license a patent or copyright."  Nor have we. 
. . . However, as we have stated, the owner of proprietary information 
has no obligation to provide it, whether to a competitor, customer, or supplier. 
Precedent makes clear that a customer who is dependent on a manufacturer's 
supply of a component can not on that ground force the producer to provide it; 
there must also be an anticompetitive aspect invoking the Sherman Act.228  
 
The message from this case is that refusal to deal or supply information/intellectual property 
to a competitor or consumer is not of itself an antitrust violation. Consumers will generally 
have a difficult time raising successful antitrust violations, as anti-competitive conduct in 
competition is an important requirement.  Where the dispute involves competitors, the refusal 
to supply, if it amounts to anti-competitive conduct, will raise a more serious issue.  This case 
also confirms that the essential facility doctrine will be of limited application and will not 
readily provide a right to access informational architecture.229
ISO and Intergraph can be contrasted with Radio Telefis Eireann v. European 
Commission (Magill), a decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).230  In Magill, due to 
the specific copyright laws in place, television stations were able to claim copyright in the 
listing of weekly  programs in Ireland.  The television stations published their own station 
specific as opposed to comprehensive weekly television guides and released daily and 
weekend details of programs to daily newspapers.231  Magill attempted to publish a 
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comprehensive weekly television guide but was enjoined from doing so on the motion of the 
television stations.232  Magill sought a declaration that in refusing to licence the copyrighted 
material the stations had engaged in antitrust violations or in European terms abused their 
dominant position in the market place.233  The ECJ agreed, opining:  
 
In the present case, the conduct objected to is the appellants' reliance 
on copyright conferred by national legislation so as to prevent Magill--or any 
other undertaking having the same intention--from publishing on a weekly 
basis information (channel, day, time and title of programmes) together with 
commentaries and pictures obtained independently of the appellants. 
Among the circumstances taken into account by the Court of First 
Instance in concluding that such conduct was abusive was, first, the fact that 
there was, according to the findings of the Court of First Instance, no actual or 
potential substitute for a weekly television guide offering information on the 
programmes for the week ahead.  On this point, the Court of First Instance 
confirmed the Commission's finding that the complete lists of programmes for 
a 24-hour period -- and for a 48-hour period at weekends and before public 
holidays -- published in certain daily and Sunday newspapers, and the 
television sections of certain magazines covering, in addition, "highlights" of 
the week's programmes, were only to a limited extent substitutable for 
advance information to viewers on all the week's programmes.  Only weekly 
television guides containing comprehensive listings for the week ahead would 
enable users to decide in advance which programmes they wished to follow 
and arrange their leisure activities for the week accordingly.  The Court of 
First Instance also established that there was a specific, constant and regular 
potential demand on the part of consumers. 
Thus the appellants -- who were, by force of circumstance, the only 
sources of the basic information on programme scheduling which is the 
indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly television guide -- gave 
viewers wishing to obtain information on the choice of programmes for the 
week ahead no choice but to buy the weekly guides for each station and draw 
from each of them the information they needed to make comparisons. 
The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by relying on 
national copyright provisions thus prevented the appearance of a new product, 
a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the appellants 
did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Such 
refusal constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the second paragraph of 
Article 86 of the Treaty. 
Second, there was no justification for such refusal either in the activity 
of television broadcasting or in that of publishing television magazines. 
Third, and finally, as the Court of First Instance also held, the 
appellants, by their conduct, reserved to themselves the secondary market of 
weekly television guides by excluding all competition on that market since 
they denied access to the basic information which is the raw material 
indispensable for the compilation of such a guide.234
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The case is significant because it held that the copyright owner was not allowed to refuse to 
supply information, thereby making the TV listings tantamount to an essential facility.235  
This decision of the ECJ, then, provides a more robust view in the context of information as 
to when it is legitimate to refuse to deal.  
Melway236 provides yet another perspective on this notion of refusal to deal.  
Melway’s, who produced a street directory for Melbourne, Australian, refused to supply the 
respondent, a wholesaler of motor vehicle parts and accessories, and a former authorised 
distributor, supplies of directories.237  The respondent alleged a breach of section 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act, which prohibits “taking advantage” of substantial market power to 
lessen competition.238  The court confirmed the relevant functional market was the wholesale 
and retail market for street directories in Melbourne and that Melway’s held in 80 – 90% of 
the retail market share for street directories.239  Melway’s, which had been marketing the 
directories since 1966, had developed a strategic method for distributing and selling the 
directories.240  The respondent had formerly been involved as a distributor but had that right 
terminated pursuant to the distributorship agreement.241
The majority of the Australian High Court held that Melway’s had the right to 
determine how to distribute their informational product.242  In the absence of any evidence 
that they had intended to oust competitors, there was nothing wrong with what they had done 
– in fact, it was simply a normal business decision.243  The economic effect of Melway’s 
action and ultimate consumer welfare (from an economic sense) seemed to be in harmony.  
Melway’s was successful in having their action vindicated. 
Judge Kirby dissent was geared toward guaranteeing and ensuring diversity of 
suppliers and access to the informational product.  He explained: 
 
The respondent's primary submission was that, properly analysed, 
Queensland Wire stands for only one relevant legal proposition applicable to 
this case.  This was that "take advantage of" means no more than "use."  In 
determining whether a corporation has "take[n] advantage of "its market 
power for a proscribed purpose, the respondent argued that all that was 
necessary was proof that, as a matter of fact, the corporation, having such 
power, had refused supply for a proscribed purpose.  Upon this view, it was 
unnecessary to pose hypothetical questions (sometimes difficult to resolve) as 
to whether such corporation could or would, acting rationally, have engaged in 
the forbidden conduct if it were subject to effective competition.  My own 
opinion is that this is correct analysis of s 46(1) of the Act.  I also consider that 
it is what the decision in Queensland Wire stands for as a binding principle of 
                                                 
235 Id. at paras. 76-88. 
236 [2001] H.C.A. 13 (Austl.). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at para. 1. 
239 Id. at para. 80. 
240 Id. The way they distribute could also be seen as an architectural constraint on the way they do business – 
like code – by slowing down copyists or, in other words, implementing their copyright. 
241 Id. at para. 87. 
242 [2001] H.C.A. 13 at para. 80. 
243 Id. at para 67.  The majority explained: 
But it does not follow that because a firm in fact enjoys freedom from competitive constraint, 
and in fact refuses to supply a particular person, there is a relevant connection between the 
freedom and the refusal. Presence of competitive constraint might be compatible with a 
similar refusal, especially if it is done to secure business advantages which would exist in a 
competitive environment. 
Id. 
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law.  There is nothing in the language of the section itself that obliges the 
ascertainment of an answer to a hypothetical question.  If, as was held in 
Queensland Wire, "take advantage of" means no more than "use", that presents 
a purely factual question to be answered.  In short, if the supplier enjoys a 
substantial degree of market power, the grant or refusal of supply is 
necessarily, as a matter of fact, taking advantage of (sc "using") such market 
power.  It is doing so because the power to grant, or refuse, supply is part of 
the power substantially to control the market.  
  . . . .  
However, if I am wrong in the foregoing, it is appropriate to consider 
the alternative approach on the footing that the hypothetical question forms 
part of the rule for which Queensland Wire stands.  If this is done, it was 
certainly open to the majority judges in the Federal Court to conclude that the 
impugned conduct on the part of the appellant involved its taking advantage of 
its market power, in the sense that, acting rationally, it would and could not 
(but for that power) have acted as it did.  Specifically, it would and could not 
have refused the respondent's offer to purchase between 30,000 and 50,000 
copies of the Melbourne directory each year.244
 
Judge Kirby’s judgement is to the effect that anyone who holds market power and refuses to 
supply is taking advantage of that market power.  This is very much a diversity (or non-
discrimination) argument that requires the information to be dealt.  It is tantamount to a right 
of access to information.  Judge Kirby was not just looking at economic transaction costs but 
also the social innovation cost, remembering innovation has a social as well as an economic 
aspect.  The delivery of this information needs a diversity of pathways.  The monopolisation 
of the delivery of information to people is not good for them – socially.  To this extent, Judge 
Kirby perhaps showed a social approach to competition law and the notion of welfare. 
Another interesting issue arises from this case.  Melway’s owns an informational 
product in which they claimed copyright.  This case, in essence, defines the right of the 
copyright owner – the right to distribute or sell the copyright product to whomever they wish.  
Yet in this instance, competition law puts a gloss on this right.  In this case, we are really 
seeing the definitions of competition and copyright law being conflated – because the refusal 
to deal is intimately connected with intellectual property rights. 
In summary, the power to make someone distribute an information product is 
contingent upon the power that they hold as a digital property owner, which will, to some 
extent, be defined by competition law.  Refusal to deal, by itself, is not generally unlawful, 
but other factors (consider Magill) will raise the level of scrutiny; this is a difficult area in 
which to be confident that you will not be liable.  Judge Kirby’s approach of guaranteeing a 
right to deal in core informational products, a little like essential facilities doctrine, may 
suggest that the time is upon us to more seriously consider access to core informational 
products as part of antitrust or competition law. 
 
 
2. The Microsoft Case 
 
The Microsoft case also highlights how intellectual property rights in software may be 
questioned in light of antitrust law.  This case concerned the dominance of the Microsoft 
                                                 
244 Id. at paras. 109, 112. 
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operating system, Windows.245  An operating system is software that allocates and manages 
the hardware resources of a computer.  The operating system combined with the hardware is 
often called the operating platform upon which many forms of applications (specific kinds of) 
software are built.  To write applications that will run on a particular platform or operating 
system one needs to ensure the application can interact with the operating system.  An 
operating system will be programmed to allow such interaction through what is known as 
application programming interfaces (APIs).  Therefore, to write code or software that will run 
on an operating system you will need to know and obey APIs.  This need to write 
applications for specific operating systems means that it is more difficult for a generic 
application to be written that can be run on all platforms.  As Judge Jackson found, Windows 
was by far the most dominant operating system in the market, with a market share in excess 
of eighty percent depending on how you calculated the figures.246
The emergence of the Internet browser and the development of the Java programming 
language by Sun Microsystems opened the way for diluting the dominance of the Windows 
operating system.  The browser developed with such speed and popularity that the potential 
opened for people to write applications to run on the browser platform, thereby reducing the 
control Microsoft had over applications development and also threatening the continued 
primacy of its Windows operating system.  Windows would become merely a part of the 
substratum that could be easily substituted if applications software could be written to the 
browser platform.  Sun’s programming language, Java, also allowed applications to be 
written in such a way that they could be ported from one platform to another.  Both of those 
developments threatened Microsoft and made it more likely for a competitor such as the open 
source operating system, Linux, to be more successful.  
One way Microsoft took on the challenge was to build up its market share in the 
internet browser area through its product, Internet Explorer (IE).  Its main rival in this area 
was the Netscape internet browser, which showed the potential to become a dominant 
platform upon which to write applications software. Microsoft was also alleged to have tried 
to make it difficult for Java based programs to run on Windows without modification.247  
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft breached sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.248  
They were found to have violated section 1 – unreasonable contracts in restraint of trade – by 
tying their browser to the operating system and ensuring through agreement with OEMs that 
the two were sold as a unit.249  Microsoft argued that Windows and IE were merely one 
product and there was no unlawful tying.  The judge called this a form of technology tying 
where software code tied the software products together.250  He held that there was a clear 
market for two separate products and, as such, this was a case of tying.251  As far as section 2 
was concerned, Judge Jackson found that Microsoft’s actions towards Netscape and Sun were 
predacious and in breach of the Sherman Act.252  As a remedy, the judge ordered that 
Microsoft Corporation be broken up into an applications company and an operating systems 
company.253
On appeal, the judge’s findings relating to tying and remedy were questioned.254  
However, Judge Jackson’s findings regarding anti-competitive use of monopoly power were 
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246 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
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not overturned.  The matter has now been sent back to the district court for further 
consideration, yet how the situation will be remedied remains to be seen. 
In summary, this case shows the limitations that can be imposed upon the owner of 
digital property (copyright in software) in the face of antitrust law.  
 
 
B. Fair Use 
 
The notion of fair use in United States copyright law255 and the narrower doctrine of 
fair dealing in UK, Canadian and Australian copyright law, defines to what extent the digital 
property owner can exclude others from use of the informational product.256  Fair use and fair 
dealing allow use without the (personal) permission of the copyright owner; for this reason, 
some call it a privilege.  In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.257 and Reimerdes, fair use 
arguments were unsuccessfully raised.  However, there has been more success in the area of 
reverse engineering of software. 
 
 
1. Reverse Engineering for Interoperability 
 
To ensure the diversity of digital identity we must argue for diversity in software 
products.258  Fundamental to software diversity is the notion of interoperability, defined in the 
DMCA as:  "the ability of computer programs to exchange information, and of such programs 
mutually to use the information, which has been exchanged."259
If a software engineer or developer constructs software that becomes the industry 
standard, that software acts as architecture for communication and it becomes, in essence, a 
platform for discourse.  In order to develop complementary and improved software products, 
in most cases, software developers will reverse engineer the industry standard software in an 
attempt to make software that can be interoperable (conversant) with the industry standard.  
To be able to successfully reverse engineer software, in most instances, one must copy (and 
in some cases "borrow" parts of) the software, which is technically an infringement of the 
copyright owner's exclusive rights over reproduction.260
In the United States, the courts have employed the fair use doctrine to mediate this 
issue,261 while more recently, Congress has legislated on the notion of interoperability in 
relation to circumvention devices in the DMCA.  Fair use defines the appropriate balance 
between a monopoly right given as an incentive for innovation and the public interest in the 
free flow of information for a variety of cultural reasons.262  
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In Australia the Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC)263 recommended 
adopting a more broad-based fair use right similar to the U.S. model in place of the existing 
narrower and more specific fair dealing exceptions.264  However, the High Court of Australia, 
in the case of Data Access Corp. v. Powerflex Services Pty. Ltd.,265 refused, in the absence of 
legislative direction, to endorse the legitimacy of reversing engineering in an instance of 
literal copying.266  The government has since enacted a (partial) legislative solution through 
amendment to the Copyright Act, 1968 in 1999.267  The reproduction or adaptation of a 
computer program for the purpose of obtaining information necessary to the independent 
creation of a new program or a device to connect to and interoperate with a program or any 
other program is, in certain circumstances, exempted from infringement.268
In European Union member countries, specific exceptions have been enacted in 
national copyright laws,269 as required by the 1991 EC Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs.270  Article 6 of the Directive provides that copying and adaptation 
occurring in the decompilation of software code is permitted where it is “indispensable to 
obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created 
computer program with other programs.”271
 
 
2. Porting to Platforms of Choice 
 
Two recent cases highlight a more specific and immediate challenge for the principle 
of fair use for interoperability in the digital environment.  The challenge is to enable software 
applications to be separated from and interoperable with a variety of operating systems and 
associated hardware (platforms).272  It is in facilitating this choice with respect to operating 
platforms (e.g, open versus proprietary) that interoperability will allow the user to speak in 
their choice of differently coded/digital voices, thereby enhancing the goal of digital 
diversity.  
In the U.S. case of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,273 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held firmly in favour of reverse engineering274 of software in 
order to allow different software products to be ported or joined (i.e., interoperate) with 
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different hardware, firmware or software platforms.275  In that case, Judge Canby, delivering 
the opinion of the court, explained that the intermediate276 copying that occurred was 
legitimate because it merely facilitated the copying of the unprotected (non-copyright) 
function or idea of the software.277  Interestingly, the existence of a patent would have made 
things more difficult for Connectix.278  However, the court clearly stated that intermediate 
copying is allowable where it is used to determine function that can facilitate the making of 
transformative (better or extended) products.279
Connectix had developed software that emulated the Sony PlayStation on a personal 
computer.280  In other words, their Virtual Game Station allowed consumers to play Sony 
games on their personal computer and not just on the Sony PlayStation console.  This allowed 
portability that the court also seemed to support in its discussion of transformative use:  "The 
product creates a new platform, the personal computer on which consumers can play games 
designed for Sony PlayStation.  This innovation affords opportunities for game play in new 
environments . . .."281  The court was not concerned with the number of intermediate copies 
that had been made nor that the end product (even though containing a different source code, 
yet the same function) competed with the Sony PlayStation.282   
In contrast, Reimerdes, which was brought pursuant to the DMCA for offering, 
providing or otherwise trafficking in a device for circumventing a technological protection 
measure (TPM), a fifteen year old boy allegedly cracked the encryption code (CSS)283 of the 
software lock (a technological protection measure) employed (it was argued) to prevent easy 
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copying of the content of Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs).284  Judge Kaplan, in his interim 
and final judgement,285 held that the reverse engineering exception of the DMCA286 could not 
be invoked.  In this case, the TPM was CSS and the circumvention device was DeCSS.287  
The defendant was alleged in the final instance to be linking to websites that allowed the 
downloading of DeCSS.288
The defendants argued that reverse engineering of the software lock was needed in 
order to play DVDs on other platforms such as Linux.289  They argued that DeCSS was 
necessary to achieve interoperability290 between computers running on the Linux system and 
DVDs; therefore, the interoperabilty exception in the DMCA was enlivened. The judge 
explained that he could not accept such an argument for three reasons:   
 
First, defendants have offered no evidence to support this assertion.  Second, 
even assuming that DeCSS runs under Linux, it concededly runs under 
Windows -- a far more widely used operating system -- as well.  It therefore 
cannot reasonably be said that DeCSS was developed "for the sole purpose" of 
achieving interoperability between Linux and DVDs.  Finally, and most 
important, the legislative history makes it abundantly clear that Section 
1201(f) permits reverse engineering of copyrighted computer programs only 
and does not authorize circumvention of technological systems that control 
access to other copyrighted works, such as movies.291
  
The defendants also made the argument that they were engaged in a fair use under Section 
107 of the Copyright Act.292  The judge rejected this argument: 
 
Section 107 of the Act provides in critical part that certain uses of copyrighted 
works that otherwise would be wrongful are "not . . . infringement[s] of 
copyright."  Defendants, however, are not here sued for copyright 
infringement.  They are sued for offering to the public and providing 
technology primarily designed to circumvent technological measures that 
control access to copyrighted works and otherwise violating Section 
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1201(a)(2) of the Act.  If Congress had meant the fair use defense to apply to 
such actions, it would have said so.293
 
A crucial issue arising from such reasoning is whether the DMCA creates an exclusive right 
in the person or entity setting the technological protection measure to control access to 
copyright works.  That would allow a person or entity to protect raw data (embodied in a 
copyright work) by encasing it in a TPM or to prevent fair use of copyright material by 
encasing it in the TPM – some suggest this is akin to locking a book or a database in a room 
or bank vault.294  Reimerdes, while acknowledging some limitations, intimates that the 
DMCA does create a right to control access to copyright works and that this does not violate 
of the First Amendment, as this incidental impact on protected expression is acceptable in 
light of the overall objective of Congress to protect copyright in the digital environment.295  It 
might be suggested that such an approach serves to eliminate fair use, create rights in 
unprotected data and portrays overly broad regulation.296  An even more pressing point to 
appreciate is that fair use rights to reverse engineer software architecture in the name of 
interoperability, where that software is a technological protection measure or lock, are 
severely restricted by the DMCA as interpreted in this case. 
One further point arising in the case and throwing light on the meaning of the DMCA 
must be noted.  In the process of arguing fair use, the defendants raised the Sony defence.  
The judge responded: 
 
Defendants claim also that the possibility that DeCSS might be used 
for the purpose of gaining access to copyrighted works in order to make fair 
use of those works saves them under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc.  But they are mistaken.  Sony does not apply to the activities with which 
defendants here are charged.  Even if it did, it would not govern here.  Sony 
involved a construction of the Copyright Act that has been overruled by the 
later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of any inconsistency between Sony 
and the new statute.  Sony was a suit for contributory infringement brought 
against manufacturers of videocassette recorders on the theory that the 
manufacturers were contributing to infringing home taping of copyrighted 
television broadcasts.  The Supreme Court held that the manufacturers were 
not liable in view of the substantial numbers of copyright holders who either 
had authorized or did not object to such taping by viewers.  But Sony has no 
application here.   
When Sony was decided, the only question was whether the 
manufacturers could be held liable for infringement by those who purchased 
equipment from them in circumstances in which there were many 
noninfringing uses for their equipment.  But that is not the question now 
before this Court.  The question here is whether the possibility of 
noninfringing fair use by someone who gains access to a protected 
copyrighted work through a circumvention technology distributed by the 
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defendants saves the defendants from liability under Section 1201.  But 
nothing in Section 1201 so suggests.  By prohibiting the provision of 
circumvention technology, the DMCA fundamentally altered the landscape.  A 
given device or piece of technology might have "a substantial noninfringing 
use, and hence be immune from attack under Sony's construction of the 
Copyright Act -- but nonetheless still be subject to suppression under Section 
1201."  Indeed, Congress explicitly noted that Section 1201 does not 
incorporate Sony. 
. . . The fact that Congress elected to leave technologically 
unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted 
works without the technical means of doing so is a matter for Congress unless 
Congress' decision contravenes the Constitution, a matter to which the Court 
turns below.297
 
In summary, the DMCA provides an exception for circumventing a TPM in order to 
look at a program to identify and analyse those elements necessary to achieve interoperability 
in the name of reverse engineering, but only to the extent permitted by copyright law, most 
commonly where a right to reverse engineer under the fair use doctrine is available.298  Thus, 
the value of interoperability and digital diversity was seen in Reimerdes as being of less 
importance than the copyright owners exclusive right to reproduction or to control access.  
This was a hard case and this type of fact scenario needs much more thought.  However, to 
prevent the porting of informational products to different platforms stifles diversity and 
allows one entity to control the structure or architecture for disseminating information and 
constructing meaning.  Is this acceptable?  Obviously a very broad right to reverse engineer 
given as an exception to copyright (or circumvention?) law reduces the incentive for 
developing software or content.  However, this must be balanced against the need for 
interoperability and digital diversity in software architecture.299
 
 
3. Fair Use:  Napster 
 
Fair use was also unsuccessfully argued in the recent Napster decision, although 
many would argue that this is a case in which the social benefits of the user outweigh the 
economic arguments of copyright protection.300  
There have been a number of decisions concerning what is known as “mp3.”  Mp3 is 
a format/software that allows digitized music to be compressed and digitally distributed 
without losing sound quality.301  The recording industry throughout the world has been 
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Until recently, the Internet was of little use for the distribution of music because the average 
music computer file was simply too big:  the digital information on a single compact disc of 
music required hundreds of computer floppy discs to store, and downloading even a single 
song from the Internet took hours.  However, various compression algorithms (which make an 
audio file "smaller" by limiting the audio bandwidth) now allow digital audio files to be 
transferred more quickly and stored more efficiently.  MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 (commonly 
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greatly concerned with the proliferation of mp3 formatted music files as this has (they say) 
the potential to undermine the whole system of copyright in popular music.  The technology 
is such that a song can be “ripped” off a CD, uploaded to the Internet for copying, 
distribution, consumption and potentially downloading or “burning” onto a compact disc. 
In many instances, the act of copying is obvious and arguably a breach of copyright.  
However, lawsuits so far have not been against the end consumer for direct copyright 
infringement but against the machine or technology manufacturers or developers for 
indirectly breaching copyright through facilitating infringement.  Napster involved suits by 
the recording industry against the company that developed and distributed software that 
enabled people to reference and access mp3 files available via the Internet.  A “live” index  
created and centrally stored at Napster allowed online users to share mp3 files/songs.  For 
instance, if I want to listen to a song called “Red River,” I would use my Napster software to 
access a list of people currently online from the Napster central server who are registered as 
having a copy of the song; then, I would request the file directly from the person who has it 
stored on their hard drive.  The file is not sent to me by Napster, but by the party who is 
registered as having a copy.  This is sometimes referred to as peer-to- peer file sharing.302  
The important point is that Napster merely facilitates the delivery of the copied song, it does 
not do any copying itself.  Should they be liable for copyright infringement?  Does the digital 
property of the copyright owner control this situation? 
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court, analogizing the “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine in U.S. patent law,303 held that Sony was not liable for copyright 
infringement for making a video recorder because a video recorder has substantial non-
copyright infringing uses, such as time shifting, i.e., recording material so that you can watch 
it at a later date.304  Could Napster rely on the same Sony defence?  
Ultimately, Napster was sued for copyright infringement on the basis of contributory 
or vicarious copyright infringement.305  Before those actions could be established, the court 
had to determine whether there had been any direct infringement by the end consumers.306  
The court concluded that there had been.307  The court rejected arguments based on fair use 
sampling (listening to see if they liked the music) and space shifting (location of where one 
listened to the music).308  The court rejected arguments based on sampling, saying that there 
was evidence to show that sampling ruined the full commercial exploitation of the songs, and 
on space shifting, saying this was not like Sony in that space shifting in this instance opened 
up copied product to the world.309
The next issue the court considered was whether there was contributory infringement. 
They listed the following elements: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
known as "MP3") is the most popular digital audio compression algorithm in use on the 
Internet, and the compression it provides makes an audio file "smaller " by a factor of twelve 
to one without significantly reducing sound quality.  MP3's popularity is due in large part to 
the fact that it is a standard, non-proprietary compression algorithm freely available for use by 
anyone, unlike various proprietary (and copyright-secure) competitor algorithms.  Coupled 
with the use of cable modems, compression algorithms like MP3 may soon allow an hour of 
music to be downloaded from the Internet to a personal computer in just a few minutes.  
Id. 
302 See Andrew Oram, Peer to Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies (2001). 
303 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
304 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
305 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
306 Id. at 1013. 
307 Id. at 1016. 
308 Id. at 1018-19. 
309 Id. at 1019. 
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1) Did Napster know or should they have known of the infringement – actual 
or constructive knowledge?  Yes, they knew users were swapping 
infringing files;310 
2) Did Napster materially contribute to the infringement?  Yes, they provided 
software;311 
3) Were there any defences?  No.  The court assessed the Sony substantial 
non-infringing use defence, explaining that current and future uses need to 
be considered, but decided the Sony defence did not apply once knowledge 
was evident;312   
4) Did they sell the technology knowing people would use it for copyright 
infringement?  In the Sony case the court said no – in Napster, the court 
said yes.313 
 
The next issue was that of vicarious infringement. The court considered the following 
elements: 
 
1) Did Napster have authority to control or supervise infringement?  Yes, 
because it could monitor song names;314 
2) Did Napster gain a direct financial benefit from infringement?  Yes, 
because it gained more users and value through the infringement.315 
 
The court also stated that the Sony defence does not apply to an action for vicarious 
copyright liability.316  Waiver, implied licence and copyright misuse arguments were all 
rejected.317  The scope of the injunction was readjusted so that song names had to be 
delivered to Napster by the record companies.318  The court of appeals left open the question 
of the application of the ISP immunity provisions of the DMCA to Napster.319  Napster is 
now engaged in a process of signing licence agreements with music companies in the 
increasingly pay-per-view/hear world. 
The key question arising out of this case is whether copyright is killing technological 
innovation.  Should the developer or innovator be liable for copyright infringement in this 
case?  What will this do for technological innovation?  This is a case of copyright versus 
cultural/social/communicative experiment – should copyright give way a little? 
Consider Sony, where it was held that a “finding of contributory infringement 
effectively extends the grant of power to encompass the accused instrumentality – where a 
technology has other lawful uses such a rule would block the wheels of commerce.”320  Is 
innovation stifled by this decision or was this simply a clear case of copying facilitated by a 
knowing intermediary?  Should the digital property owner be able to control innovation in 
technology that may represent a risk to the value of that property?  So far, in the context of 
the new digital technologies, the answer from the courts is likely to be “yes.” 
                                                 
310 See id. at 1020-22. 
311 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022. 
312 See id. at 1020. 
313 Id. at 1020-21. 
314 Id. at 1023. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 1022. 
317 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026-27. 
318 Id. at 1027. 
319 Id. at 1025. 
320 Sony, 464 U.S. at 441. 
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In light of the foregoing discussion it can be seen that fair use is an extremely 
important variable in the definition of digital property and will be raised in many instances, 
with varying degrees of success. 
 
 
C. Privacy Law 
 
The notion of privacy means at very least the right to control personal 
information/informational self-determination.321  This right has long been recognised in 
international law.322  Privacy or data protection law promises to be a key determinant of 
informational property in the digital age. 
While use of private information by government and public bodies has been regulated in the 
United States, Canada and Australia during the last twenty years, the flow of data in the 
private sector has been subject to very little legal constraint.  In 1995, the European Union, in 
response to concerns over the invasive nature of the Internet and its tremendous capacity to 
trace and profile individual identity, promulgated the European Directive on Data 
Protection.323  In short, the Directive requires member states to enact legislation covering the 
processing of data collection in the private sector.324  The purpose for which the information 
was gathered must be disclosed at the point of receipt, and the information may only be used 
for that purpose.325  Individuals have the right to see data on themselves, yet full and 
informed consent by the data subject may be used to override many of the obligations 
imposed by the Directive.326  Most importantly, Article 25 of the EU Directive stipulates that 
EU businesses cannot disclose data to members of third party states unless it is shown that 
effective data protection regimes are in place in those states.  In April 2000 Canada 
responded by enacting similar obligations in the Privacy and Electronic Documents Act.327  
Likewise, in December 2000 Australia enacted the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) 
Act.328  In the United States, legislation has been avoided.  In its place, the United States 
Department of Commerce has promulgated safe harbour rules, which act as an optional self-
regulatory structure.  The efficacy of such a regime is still in question.  
In the United States, state constitutional law and other forms of specific state privacy 
legislation329 may also be relevant in some cases; e.g., Californian Constitution Article 1, 
Section (1):  "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and 
                                                 
321 See Lee A. Bygrave & Kamiel J. Koelman, Privacy, Data Protection and Copyright: Their Interaction in the 
Context of Electronic Copyright Management Systems, in Copyright and Electronic Commerce: Legal Aspects 
of Electronic Copyright Management 59, 64-65 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 2000); see also Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1977); Julie E. 
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (2000); 
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475 (1968); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960); 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People From Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049 (2000); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandies, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
322 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15, at art. 12. 
323 Council Directive 1/95, 1995 O.J. (C93) 1. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 See id.; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8 (reinforcing this idea). 
327 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C., ch. 5 (2000) (Can.). 
328 Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act, 2000, no. 155 (Austl.). 
329 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1749.60  (Supermarket Club Card Legislation) (2001), 1708.7 (2001) 
(Cyberstalking); Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, 11 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 151, 189-202 (1995). 
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protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."330  Through 
this provision, “California accords privacy the constitutional status of an inalienable right on 
a par with defending life and possessing property.”331  “Privacy is protected not merely 
against state action; it is considered an inalienable right that may not be violated by 
anyone.”332  
More recently, litigation in the United States against the banner advertisement 
company DoubleClick addressed the legality of “cookies” (technology that allows the 
viewing habits of your computer to be traced).333  The legal arguments made pursuant to 
federal law, which were based on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Wire Tapping 
Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, against DoubleClick were dismissed.334  The 
more interesting state law claims concerning the privacy tort,335 unjust enrichment and 
possibly trepass to chattels were not dealt with by the federal court.  It remains to be seen 
whether the privacy tort (intrusion upon seclusion) can successfully be argued in a case 
involving cookie technology.  And when that happens, courts will have to ask:  Would it be 
illegal for someone to follow you around in real space and note your buying habits?336  Have 
you put yourself in public view by logging onto the network?  There may also be a First 
Amendment challenge against such state based privacy tort, unjust enrichment and trespass 
actions.337  
Increasingly, privacy regimes for the private sector will regulate the way in which 
private data can be exploited in the market place.  The message to be taken from the 
European Directive is that you should not collect private information unless you need to, but 
if you must then explain the purpose, collect it in a fair way, allow access to it by the data 
subject and gain their consent for using it in secondary ways.  Surreptitious or covert ways of 
collecting information should not be encouraged; however if the information can be collected 
without identifying the subject then the law will usually not be breached.338  Although, in 
those cases where the manner of collection allows fairly precise identification, even without a 
name, such collection will not be allowed.   
An interesting question that arose in the DoubleClick case and that is allied to the 
notion of database rights is whether the data subject has a right to claim payment for the data 
that has been collected and is being exploited.  There, the court explained: 
 
Plaintiffs also contend that they have suffered economic damages 
consisting of the value of:  (1) the opportunity to present plaintiffs with 
                                                 
330 Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1. 
331 Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990). 
332 Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citations omitted). 
333 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
334 See id. 
335 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1997). 
336 See generally Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that mere information 
gathering about a particular person does not give rise to action for invasion of privacy where information is 
open to the public and voluntarily given). 
337 See Volokh, supra note 329; U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999); see generally Jennifer 
Barrett et al., Data Privacy Laws and the First Amendment: A Conflict, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. 
L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing First Amendment and data protection issues); Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the 
First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 97 (2000) (discussing 
same). 
338 See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (noting “‘personal data’ shall mean any 
information relating to an identified or unidentifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one 
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”). 
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advertising; and (2) the demographic information DoubleClick has collected. 
Essentially, they argue that because companies pay DoubleClick for plaintiffs' 
attention (to advertisements) and demographic information, the value of these 
services must, in some part, have rightfully belonged to plaintiffs.  They point 
to AOL in which the court appeared to hold that damage to "reputation and 
goodwill" counted towards the damage threshold and argue that, by the same 
logic, the economic value of their attention and demographic information 
should count as well.  
Even assuming that the economic value of plaintiffs' attention and 
demographic information could be counted towards the monetary threshold -- 
a dubious assumption -- it would still be insufficient.  We do not commonly 
believe that the economic value of our attention is unjustly taken from us 
when we choose to watch a television show or read a newspaper with 
advertisements and we are unaware of any statute or caselaw that holds it is.  
We see no reason why Web site advertising should be treated any differently. 
A person who chooses to visit a Web page and is confronted by a targeted 
advertisement is no more deprived of his attention's economic value than are 
his off-line peers.  Similarly, although demographic information is valued 
highly (as DoubleClick undoubtedly believed when it paid over one billion 
dollars for Abacus), the value of its collection has never been considered a 
economic loss to the subject.  Demographic information is constantly collected 
on all consumers by marketers, mail-order catalogues and retailers.  However, 
we are unaware of any court that has held the value of this collected 
information constitutes damage to consumers or unjust enrichment to 
collectors.339   
 
While the court was apprehensive about recognising this personal claim for the value of the 
private data, some academics have gone as far as suggesting that people should be recognised 
in law as possessing a property (intellectual property?) right in their personal information.340  
This would allow people to protect such information through law and to charge for it in the 
market place.  Samuelson has cautioned against such an approach, arguing that it would 
distort the rationale for having property rights in information, which could lead to higher 
transaction costs and a worsened situation for the data subject.341  She prefers a form of 
licensing that licenses private information along the same lines as trade secret licensing, 
where one contractually structures the usage rights of the information before disclosure.342   
It can be seen from this brief analysis that the growing law on privacy or data 
protection, especially in the private sector, will have a significant impact upon the shape and 
content of digital property rights.  
 
 
IV.  Contractually Defined Digital Property 
 
                                                 
339 In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Weld v. CVS Pharmacy 
Inc., 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 217 (Mass. Super. 1999). 
340 See Cohen, supra note 327; see also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1283 (2000). 
341 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1125 (2000). 
342 See id. 
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The contract, an agreement between two or more parties, is the foundation of many 
privately ordered relationships and is increasingly being used to regulate informational 
property entitlements in the digital environment.  
 
 
A. Contractually Created Informational Property Rights 
 
Contractual rights can be used to extend public or legislative rights to informational 
value, especially in the area of data capital.343  While there may be no recognised legislative 
intellectual property right in data, a contract can be used to regulate the way in which people 
use information that has been collected to create contractual or privately ordered 
informational property rights.  The limit of a contract (besides some complex constitutional 
issues) is that it is only enforceable against the parties to the contract and not the world at 
large.  For instance, if I buy a licence to use data that contains restrictions on my further 
copying, selling or exploiting the data, that licence will not bind a stranger who copied the 
data.  
 
 
B. Contractual Licensing 
 
Contract is also very important to the broader issue of information licensing.344  In the 
information economy informational products are usually licensed and not sold; the license is 
the product.  In most instances you do not receive an ownership right to anything but rather a 
right to use information.  In real space, when I buy a book I do not obtain ownership of the 
copyright owner’s right to reproduce the book, but I do gain ownership of the physical thing 
called the book.  With informational products, such as software games and digital images, 
you are usually only given a licence to use the information for specific purposes, and to this 
end, you must read the licence closely to determine your user rights.  In essence, the 
contractual licence determines “exploitation” and “user” rights in information and in this way 
contract is used as a mechanism for defining digital property.   
 
 
C. Formation of Contractual Licences 
 
An issue vitally important to this contractual definition of digital property is the way in 
which contractual licences are formed.  In order to determine informational rights, it is 
important to know whether a contract is in existence and upon what terms.  This question has 
been raised in the context of shrink-wrap and click-wrap/click-through contracts.  "Shrink-
wrap contracts" are normally used where the product, e.g., software, is sold in a store.  The 
terms of the contract are shrink-wrapped around the product in fine print and in most 
instances not fully disclosed until after opening the package.  “Click-wrap or click-through 
contracts” are normally employed in an online environment, such as the Internet, and may, at 
best, involve the acceptance of the terms of the contract by clicking on a digital icon denoting 
                                                 
343 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
344 See Gail E. Evans & Brian F. Fitzgerald, Information Transactions Under UCC Article 2B: The Ascendancy 
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consent after having been shown the terms.  In some click wrap cases, which are highly 
questionable from a legal perspective, terms are not clearly displayed prior to the buyer 
entering into the agreement.  In the recent decision of Specht v. Netscape Communications 
Corp and AOL,345 a third type of situation called “browse-wrap” was outlined.  A browse-
wrap scenario arises where the Internet consumer is not required to negotiate an “I agree” 
button or icon or view the licence terms before gaining access to the product.  Instead, the 
terms are located behind a button/icon on the website that the consumer is not forced to view 
or engage.  In Specht, the court held that the browse-wrap scenario would not usually give 
rise to a valid contract.346
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,347 the court held that shrink-wrap, and arguably click-wrap, 
licences are enforceable in certain circumstances.348  ProCD developed a product known as 
Select Phone (the compilation of over 3,000 telephone directories on CD), which was sold in 
stores for $150.349  ProCD invested over $10 million in developing this product.350  Mindful 
of the Feist decision and the inability of copyright law to protect raw data, ProCD sought to 
commodify informational value through a contractual agreement.351  Shrink-wrapped around 
the CD in plastic or cellophane was a detailed user agreement or licence, which contained a 
term stipulating that the application program or information should not be on sold for 
commercial purposes.352  Zeidenberg allegedly purchased the CD, went home and loaded it 
onto a website where it was sold at a price less than that charged by ProCD.353  He was sued 
for breach of contract and argued that nothing in the contract prevented him from selling the 
information.354  He argued that, at the point of purchase, it was impossible to read all the 
terms of the shrink-wrapped licence; therefore, he had no adequate notice of those terms and 
was not bound by them.355  The court held that the economics of the new information 
economy suggested that he should be bound by the shrink-wrapped terms and furthermore, if 
he did not like them, he could have taken the CD back, but by acquiescing and choosing to 
keep and use the informational product he was bound by the terms.356  While many have 
questioned whether this reasoning is fair, it is now embodied in sections 208 and 209 of 
UCITA, under the umbrella of layered contracting.357  
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 60
Judge Easterbrook rejected the argument that the contractual licence was preempted 
by section 301(a) of the U.S. Copyright Act.  The argument was that creating copyright-like 
rights in data, the contractual user agreement was in contravention of section 301 of the 
Copyright Act, which preempts states from legislating on the issue of copyright.358  Judge 
Easterbrook held that contractual information rights and legislated copyrights were 
fundamentally different.359  He explained that contract is a mechanism for private ordering 
that applies only between the parties to the contract whereas the Copyright Act is public 
legislation that applies to the world at large.360   
Some critics have said that non-negotiated mass market licences are much more like 
legislation than contract and should be closely scrutinised in terms of preemption.361  Lemley 
suggests that the weight of the ProCD decision should not be overstated as it goes against the 
majority of judicial opinion on the issue.362  In Australia, the courts have yet to explicitly 
determine the legal validity of shrink-wrap and click-wrap contracts.  Such contracts will 
inevitably be challenged, as in the United States, on the basis that they do not adequately 
disclose the terms of the contract prior to the entering of the agreement.363  The issue of the 
formation of contractual licences will continue to be important to the complexion and 
definition of digital property because knowing whether a contract exists, and upon what 
terms, is intimately connected to informational exploitation and user rights. 
 
 
D. Contractual Allocation of Domain Names 
 
Contract has been even more prominent in the area of domain name allocation. 
Allocation of the premium Internet commercial trading domain “.com” is now performed 
through a contractual regime created under the auspices of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)364 requiring arbitration.365
The recent string of personality cases concerning JuliaRoberts.com, Sting.com and 
Madonna.com are interesting examples.366  Enterprising business people moved in early and 
registered those domains.  The famous stars behind the names wanted them and sought to 
invoke the ICANN dispute resolution policy, which involves compulsory arbitration.  At the 
time of registration, the domain name registrants contractually bind themselves, in the 
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instance of a dispute, to enter arbitration and abide by the decision.  If the registrant is found 
to have registered and used the domain name in bad faith, vis-a-vis a trademark, they stand to 
lose that registration.  Julia Roberts and Madonna were successful in showing the necessary 
elements, including that they possessed a trademark, while Sting, due to the generic nature of 
the word and other difficulties, did not possess the requisite trademark.  
This system is in line for an overhaul as the legitimacy, consistency and 
accountability of the process is in question.367  Nevertheless, let me make some observations.  
The ICANN system of resolving domain name disputes, which has dealt with in excess of 
3,000 cases since the beginning of the year 2000, has sought to protect informational value 
through contractually agreed principles.  To date, the majority of the decisions have favoured 
the traditional trademark holder and not the domain name speculator.  Domain name 
speculation has been treated like a case of the theft of the investment value of the 
trademark.368  The speculator has rarely been regarded as deserving of reward.  Perhaps there 
should be arguments for value on both sides, but this value is difficult to apportion.  For good 
or bad, what this system shows very clearly is a contractual regime being used to ensure 
informational value is realised as wealth.   
Recently, Parisi v Net Learning Inc.,369 held that Uniform Domain Names Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP) determinations are not arbitrations for the purposes of the Federal 
Arbitration Act and thereby do not prevent access or review in the courts, explaining that 
“[a]lthough ICANN exerts quasi-governmental sway over the growth and administration of 
the Internet, the UDRP is enforced through contract rather than regulation.”370
To ease the pressure on the .com domain, to add greater specificity and to reduce 
disputes over domain names, ICANN has approved the allocation of seven new generic top 
level domains (TLDs):  .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro.371  The interesting 
question is how these domains will be contractually allocated.  Will trademark holders be 
given priority and, if so, which trademark holders will gain priority?  Will existing .com 
registrants have the ability to block others registering in these domains? 
The first to be allocated will be .biz and .info.  According to the ICANN press release, 
.info will be an unrestricted TLD, open to any business or person to register for any purpose, 
while .biz will be a restricted TLD, open only for commercial or business purposes.372  In 
November 2000, registry operators NeuLevel (.biz) and Afilias (.info) were among seven 
registry operators for new TLDs selected by the ICANN Board of Directors following an 
open process for submission of proposals.  Agreements with the operators of .aero, .coop, 
.museum, .name, and .pro are in the process of being completed.  
 To provide for a stable, fair, and orderly introduction of the new TLDs, NeuLevel and 
Afilias will employ different three-step approaches to launch their registry services:  
 
NeuLevel (.biz):  
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1. Intellectual Property Claim Service.  Beginning in late May through 
the beginning of July, .biz will offer a fee-based service for businesses to 
submit trademark claims before the application process is opened.  Under this 
service, domain-name applicants will be notified of a trademark owner's claim 
when they submit an application for a claimed name and, if they decide to go 
ahead with the registration, the business submitting the claim will be notified 
of the registration and will be given a window of opportunity to challenge the 
registration using an administrative dispute resolution procedure.  
 
2. Domain Name Application and Selection. Beginning in July through 
late September, .biz will open the application process for businesses. 
Businesses will submit their applications through registrars; these applications 
will be randomly selected in batches and awarded.  Businesses can submit an 
unlimited number of applications but there will be a $2.00 fee for each 
application for a .biz name.  
 
3. .biz Begins Operations.  In October, .biz names that have been 
awarded will become operational. .biz will use a Restriction Dispute 
Resolution Process (RDRP) similar to the ICANN UDRP process to resolve 
challenges related to the business-only restricted nature of the registry. 373
 
Afilias (.info):  
 
1. Sunrise Period.  Beginning in late June and ending in late July, Afilias will 
offer a 30 day "sunrise" period during which anyone with a registered national 
trademark can apply through a registrar for a .info domain name 
corresponding to the trademark.  Trademark data will be provided at the time 
of application and the term of the domain name registration will be for at least 
5 years.  To assure fair and equal access during the sunrise period, registrars 
will first collect applications and deliver them to Afilias.  Afilias will then 
implement a multi-round batch processing system in which it will randomly 
select applications from each registrar's batch.  The World Intellectual 
Property Association (WIPO) will administer a challenge procedure through 
which any third party may challenge these sunrise period registrations to 
ensure that they comply with the applicable requirements. This challenge 
process will be available for approximately 120 days after Afilias begins 
accepting applications for .info domain names from the general public, ending 
in November.  
 
2. Domain Name Application and Registration. Within 15 days after 
the conclusion of the sunrise period, Afilias will begin accepting applications 
for .info domain names from the general public.  To ensure that ordinary 
Internet users have an equal chance to register names during the initial launch 
phase, .info names will be registered using a multi-round batch process similar 
to the one used for sunrise period applications.  Using this process, Afilias will 
randomly select applications from batches submitted by each registrar. This 
process is an alternative to a pure first-come-first-served system which could 
operate to the unfair advantage of those with mechanized registration scripts. 
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This batch process will last approximately three weeks, after which Afilias 
will process applications on a real-time basis.  
 
3. .info Begins Operations. Names awarded during the sunrise period 
will become operational one week after the beginning of the general 
application and registration process.  The remainder of the awarded info 
names will become operational promptly after Afilias processes them.374  
 
These policies are contractual in nature and already there has been concern over their 
implementation; NeuLevel was reportedly threatened with legal action over the random 
allocation of .biz in the face of competing trademark holders.  Such a challenge will call into 
question the power of this new contractually based informational property regime to 
effectively operate.  In this type of challenge, the power of contract to allocate “some” of the 
value of digital property created under statute will be closely considered.  This may, in turn, 
lead parties to further contemplate the values or policies upon which the contractual regime is 
founded. 
Overall, let me make this simple point.  Contract is a vital strategy in creating and 
defining digital property. 
 
 
V.  Technologically Defined Digital Property 
 
More and more, technology is being used as a means of regulating our behaviour in 
relation to informational products.  In his seminal book, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace,375 Stanford University law professor Larry Lessig highlights how the digital 
environment is not a given, but rather a construction of code writers.  The “nature” we inhabit 
in the digital world is one constructed through technology and technologists.  In Lessig’s 
theory, there are four modalities of regulation:  customary norms; the market; law; and 
architecture.  If I want to stop someone from speeding, I can employ the four modalities of 
regulation by encouraging a customary norm that speeding is bad through:  advertising; 
raising the price of petrol; enacting a law to say speeding is an offence; and building a 
restraining architecture such as a mechanical limit in the car or speed bumps.  It is as simple 
as speed bumps.  Just as architecture in real space can constrain our action, Lessig explains 
architecture in the digital world (code) can regulate what we do.  
Therefore, instead of relying solely on law (e.g., copyright law) to protect my 
informational value (e.g., software), I should consider what technological mechanisms are 
available to regulate access and use of my informational product.  The big players have 
already begun this process and we will hear more and more about the role encryption will 
serve in the distribution of digital entertainment informational products through a framework 
of digital rights management.  And while many advocate that technological restraints need to 
be principled and give balanced access to the public – in the way copyright legislation does – 
the legislatures have enacted laws like the DMCA in the United States and the Copyright 
Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act in Australia that serve to buttress technological constraints 
by making it a crime to deal in or provide devices that circumvent technological protection 
measures.  These types of laws, combined with code, will make technological protection 
measures crucial in the new environment.  
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For example, the latest version of a popular software product contains technological 
or coded restraints that make it very difficult to copy and load the software on to a second 
machine.  This technological constraint is designed to enforce copyright in the software.  
Likewise, DVDs are distributed with anti-copying CSS encryption, which will only allow 
them to be accessed through an authorised player.  Some fear that coded restraints could 
become a law unto themselves and slant protection too far in favour of the property holder.  
The Reimerdes case highlights the notion of “code as law.”376  The thrust of Lessig’s 
argument, in contrast to that of early digital libertarians, was that governments should 
regulate cyberspace to counteract the negative effects of code.377  He argued that the public 
values inserted into everyday life by legislation and the common law (for example the fair 
use doctrine in copyright law), were at risk in a code based world where private corporations 
regulated activity according to their private values.378  The world of code needed to be 
infused with public values through law.  The DMCA, in essence, does the opposite, in that it 
is a law that has been enacted to preserve the power of the code by prohibiting people from 
breaking through or cracking code.  In Lessig’s schema, there should now be another law that 
sits on top of the DMCA that inserts values into the system. 
Imagine a world where an informational product can be distributed to the consumer in 
a way that copying of and access to the informational product can be severely restricted.  
Imagine a world in which chapters of a book can be downloaded or streamed, but not printed 
or copied.  In this type of scenario, or “pay-per-view” world, encryption will be used as the 
technological mechanism for limiting use of informational products.  A large number of 
people are concerned that such a state of affairs would lead to the demise of our current fair 
use rights to copy a chapter of a book or to read a book in a library.  It could be argued that 
we should jettison fair use rights and reconceptualize the way public interest will be served in 
a world of code.  Perhaps things might work better without fair use and that holding on to 
such a principle in the digital/crypto world is conservative and dated.  However, I am yet to 
be convinced that I am a dinosaur, or that the demise of fair use is a good thing. 
How do we ensure the code world and its digital property will espouse public values 
of user and access?  The answer to this question requires us to determine the source and 
location of values inherent to digital property and their continued relevance and 
enforceability.  
 
 
VI.  The Values Defining Digital Property:  Digital Constitutionalism 
 
As we have seen to this point, digital property takes definition from legislation, contract and 
technology.  The Constitution, as a foundational document bringing fairness to the exercise 
of power, acts as an overlay.  However, U.S. constitutional law and its fundamental values, 
such as free speech and equality, are only operative where there is evidence of state action:  
legislative, administrative or judicial.379  Therefore, U.S. constitutional law will have limited 
application in the privatised world of code, where private technology corporations build self-
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executing digital architecture embedded/coded with corporate, not public values.  The 
doctrine of state action, which perpetuates the public/private divide, is a crucial issue to 
understand.  Some suggest its enduring nature in U.S. constitutional law comes from the 
notion of laissez faire – the idea that people like to think their private actions are regulated by 
little more than the market.380  Whatever its rationale, the notion of state action means that, in 
many cases, values inherent in public constitutionalism will have limited impact in the digital 
world.  This challenges us to conceptualise a notion of digital constitutionalism wherein 
public values are implemented.  As this section will highlight, the notion of digital 
constitutionalism, which seeks to implement a principled allocation of power/rights over 
information, will combine aspects of public constitutionalism, statutory and common law 
adjudication and perhaps new legislation in relation to technology/code. 
 Where digital property rights are founded on legislative action pursuant to the IP 
clause, then constitutional values inherent in that clause, as well as notions such as free 
speech, will need to be weighed in the balance.  Furthermore, general law principles of access 
and user rights, as evidenced by fair use doctrine and antitrust law, will provide definition to 
any legislated digital property right.  I have argued above that legal principles such as 
antitrust and fair use have the potential to implement/guarantee a diversity ethic in the digital 
environment. 
For digital property rights constructed or extended through contract, the role of 
constitutionally entrenched rights and values will be more remote.  If the contract is simply 
building on legislative rights, then the constitutional issues will be relevant to that aspect, but 
what of the situation where contract purports to create digital property rights, e.g., in the case 
of raw data.  First would come the question of whether this conflicts with the Constitution or 
legislation, such as section 301 of the Copyright Act; this might require further consideration 
as to whether it is a negotiated or mass market licence, the latter being more like conflicting 
legislative action.381  However, assuming we take the view enunciated in ProCD that such a 
contractual process is lawful, then we are left to find values in the field of contract law.  A 
vigorous notion of unconscionability developed to address the specific needs of information 
contracts might provide a way of ensuring that access and user rights are maintained.  
However, if contract is tied with technology and the contract is self-executing through 
technology – meaning access to data is denied if copying for fair use occurs – then 
enforcement of such a principle will require the user to litigate and enforce an emerging 
principle of unknown quality i.e., informational unconscionability.382  The potential of self-
executing contracts would also mean that state action would be hard to establish against the 
property holder and therefore issues such as free speech would not easily be raised.  
A further question concerns the extent to which contract can be used to oust fair use 
rights bestowed by the Copyright Act.383  Does contract have the power to define digital 
property by removing access and user rights granted by the Copyright Act to engage in 
reverse engineering of software for interoperability purposes?  This issue is hotly contested 
by different interest groups; however, if contract does have this capacity, then it becomes a 
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most important strategy in defining digital property rights.  Another issue will be the extent to 
which contract is limited by antitrust doctrine through its definition of digital property. 
Furthermore, can contract oust the first sale doctrine?  The first sale doctrine, 
expressed in section 109 of the U.S. Copyright Act384 and implied in Australian copyright 
law,385 allows the copyright owner to control distribution of the tangible embodiment of 
copyright up to the point of first sale.  For example, if I buy a book, I gain an ownership right 
to the book and can sell it but not reproduce it, unless I have a fair use/fair dealing right.  I 
gain ownership of the tangible book and thereby reduce the power of the copyright owner, 
but I do not gain ownership of the remaining exclusive rights of the copyright owners such as 
the reproduction right.  First sale is an important distributive principle and to some extent 
software licensing challenges this distributive mechanism.  Software is generally licensed, 
not sold, as is an ever increasing variety of information products.  We are sold access or user 
rights to information rather than tangible ownership rights.  This is done through a 
contractual user agreement/licence, which stipulates the user rights of consumers.  The 
contractual licence allows greater control over the exploitation of the informational product.  
On one hand, it could be that contract cannot be used to override such a fundamental 
principle of copyright law.  Informational products are either sold or leased.  In DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.,386 the court suggested that contract 
can be used to oust first sale.387
Lastly, there is technologically created property.  Once again, code has the power to 
define and enforce, through self-execution, access and user rights in accordance with the 
values of the private corporation setting the code.  In this situation, the Constitution is 
unlikely to provide the values as there is no state actor, and in many cases, no need to use a 
court for enforcement purposes.  However, if contract is intertwined with the coded 
distribution of information, there may be points at which constitutional or general law values 
can be argued.  In the absence of applicable constitutional doctrine, statutory law or common 
law, technology will be used to construct property rights in the vision of the private 
corporation.  This is the point at which Lessig suggests we need to legislate for digital 
constitutional values.  Likewise, Berman has suggested that we need to invoke principles of 
public constitutionalism in disputes emanating from the private sphere.388
It is worth citing two examples to give further insight on these issues.  There is the 
case where a large ISP blocks out unsolicited e-mail sent by a marketing firm (spam), who 
then argues that such action is an infringement on free speech.389  The ISP explains that they 
are not a state actor and the court agrees.390  Should private action of such a public nature, 
where the ISP’s mailboxes and networks are vital to the widespread dissemination of 
information, trump the marketing firm’s free speech interest?  Should the private property be 
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open for this purpose?  In general, owners of private property are not required to allow their 
property to be used for speech purposes though there are exceptions.391  Is there a principle of 
free speech in this private space where property law and notions such as trespass392 and 
nuisance predominate?  Had the ISP sought to enforce its rights through a trespass action, the 
issue of free speech and state action may gain more support.393  However, through self-
executing code, an ISP is able to enforce its private norms, forcing the marketing firm to 
bring the action to court.  In doing so, marketing firms must scramble to find an 
unconscionability or diversity principle/ethic in their favour since such a principle has yet to 
be fully developed for the digital environment.  The lack of a sophisticated notion of digital 
constitutionalism hinders the making of an already difficult argument. 
Secondly, imagine a private corporation that encrypts and distributes information it on 
its own terms.  UCITA contains the power to be activated remotely or through self-help;394 
thus it is self-enforcing with no need for the court system.  Code rules.  In this case, the 
values or principles of the transaction are inserted and implemented by the private 
corporation.  The public values of fair use and free access, and in a broader sense respect for 
the public domain, are not necessarily implemented in this regime.  For example, I buy a 
book that may not be printed or copied and may be read or viewed only once.  The code 
enforces this process and therefore a court will not be brought into the question unless there is 
a valid cause of action, i.e., unconsionability. 
Contrast contract outside the realm of code.  While I might sign a hard copy contract 
containing what I consider to be the complete terms of the agreement, the legislature and the 
courts may still insert public interest principles, such as the notion of unconscionability.  Do 
we need legislation to ensure that these new code driven information contracts are 
informationally conscionable?  Will the current law suffice? 
 
Lessig explains much the same thing in the following way:  
 
The dissimilarity is this:  with every enforced contract – with every 
agreement that subsequently calls upon an enforcer to carry out the terms of 
that agreement – there is a judgment made by the enforcer about whether this 
obligation should be enforced. In the main, these judgments are made by a 
court.  And when a court makes such judgments, the court considers not just 
the private orderings constituted in the agreement before it, but also issues of 
public policy, which can, in some contexts, override these private orderings.  
When a court enforces the agreement, it decides how far the power of the 
court can be used to carry out the agreement.  Sometimes the agreement will 
be carried out in full; but often, the agreements cannot be fully effected.  
Doctrines such as impossibility or mistake will discharge certain obligations.  
Rules about remedy will limit the remedies the parties can seek.  Public policy 
exceptions will condition the kinds of agreements that can be enforced. 
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‘Contracts’ incorporate all these doctrines, and it is the mix of this set of 
public values, and private obligations, that together produce what we call ‘a 
contract.’  
When the code enforces agreements, however, or when the code 
carries out a self-imposed constraint, these public values do not necessarily 
enter into the mix.  Consequences that a court might resist (forfeitures, for 
example), the code can impose without hesitation.  The code writer operates 
free of the implicit limitations of contract law.  He or she can construct an 
alternative regime for enforcing voluntary constraints.  And nothing requires 
or ensures that this alternative regime will comport with the values of the 
background regime we call ‘contract.’ 
 . . . . 
For again, in real space, one might well believe that a set of obligations 
imposed through contract was untroubling.  Conditioned by antitrust law, 
limited by principles of equity, cabined by doctrines of mistake and excuse – 
the obligations would be checked by a court before the constraints were made 
effective.  There is a structural safety check on obligations of this sort, which 
ensures that the obligations don't reach too deep.  When intervening to enforce 
these obligations, a court would carry with it the collection of tools that 
contract law has developed to modify, or soften, the obligations that contract 
law might otherwise enforce.  
 
The cyberspace analog has no equivalent toolbox.  Its obligations are not conditioned 
by the public values that contract law embraces.  Its obligations instead flow 
automatically from the structures imposed in the code.  These structures serve the 
private ends of the code writer; they are a private version of contract law.  But as the 
Legal Realists spent a generation teaching, and as we seem so keen to forget:  contract 
law is public law.395
 
The point to make is that technology will play a significant role in defining digital property 
and it is imperative that the values of such technologically constructed digital property be 
clearly enunciated.  These are values that will underpin the construction of culture and 
knowledge, and define the framework for the creation and transfer of wealth through digitised 
informational products.   
 
 
Conclusion:  The Ultimate Boundary?  A Question of Digital Constitutionalism  
 
The purpose of this article has been to seek a better understanding and definition of 
digital property.  As the foregoing pages show, this is a complex process of reasoning. 
 
At a more traditional constitutional level, the intellectual property enumerating 
clauses will set limits and bring definition to digital property.  As well, free speech, where 
constitutionally entrenched, has the potential to rigorously refine digital property, but has yet 
to fully achieve this outcome.  
One of the most crucial points to appreciate in defining digital property is the role of 
concepts of statutory or common law (non-constitutional law).  As the discussion of antitrust 
                                                 
395 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 530-31 
(1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 
 69
and fair use principles highlights, general law will play an aggressive role in defining the 
boundaries of digital property and has the potential to infuse it with a diversity ethic designed 
to facilitate distributed intelligence and democratic society. 
Next, we need to understand how contract and technology will coalesce in the digital 
world to refine access and user rights – to implement the emerging pay-per-view 
world/culture in which fair use rights evaporate in the face of information user rights 
distributed through digital rights management systems rooted in encryption and reinforced by 
anti-circumventions laws.  Faced with this emerging technology based distribution of digital 
property, we are forced to ask whether “any” information at all should be open to be freely 
accessed or copied?  If we answer “yes,” then we must advocate digital rights that enhance 
these social attributes.  This challenges us to propose principles of digital constitutionalism:  
on one hand, we must question how informational power should be exercised and on the 
other, how value should be protected?  For many of us, complete ownership will not be 
appreciated.  A negotiated multitudinous distributed notion of ownership is sought in which 
the cultural dynamic of information must be appreciated. 
In the final reckoning, the ultimate boundary of digital property will remain a hotly 
contested legal concept in which many aspects of law and culture will be presented.  The 
more we realise the inherent and incredible discursive nature of information and 
informational products, the more we will look for diversity in the construction and use of 
digital property, as well as the principles that will guarantee this diversity against a backdrop 
of what might be termed “digital constitutionalism.” 
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